On Point: 29. Postconv. Motions

State v. Duanne D. Townsend, 2019AP787, 6/9/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Good news: the court of appeals reversed a circuit court decision denying Townsend’s §974.06 motion without a hearing. Townsend now gets a one on his claims for ineffective assistance of postconviction and trial counsel. Bad news: the court of appeals botched the issue of whether Townsend was denied his 6th Amendment right to determine his own defense under McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S Ct. 1500 (2018). As noted in our post on McCoy, SCOW needs to square that decision with Wisconsin case law.

State v. Antonio L. Bell, 2018AP1593 & 1594, 12/27/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Bell pleaded to two sexual assaults: one of his 9-year-old daughter and one of his 14-year-old stepdaughter. He maintained his innocence but insisted that he would plead to spare them from testifying. After sentencing, he filed postconviction motions alleging his counsel didn’t sufficiently investigate the possibility that the 14-year-old’s boyfriend was the actual perpetrator, and also that there was newly-discovered evidence in the form of a more detailed recantation by the 9-year-old: she now also said it was the boyfriend who’d assaulted her. The circuit court denied both without a hearing, but the court of appeals now says Bell should have a chance to prove his claims.

State ex rel. Milton Eugene Warren v. Michael Meisner, 2019AP567-W, petition for review granted 10/16/19; reversed and remanded 6/10/20; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point based on the petition for review)

Whether under State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, Warren’s § 974.06 postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by the lawyer appointed on direct appeal should be heard in the circuit court or the Court of Appeals.

State v. James Edward Olson, 2018AP1987, 9/17/18, District 1 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Olson says that the DOC extended his probation by six months without notice to him, and he shouldn’t have to pay the fees associated with those six months. The court of appeals has two problems with this claim: the record contains an order for the extension, apparently signed by him, and his probation ended in 1997.

State v. Amy Joan Zahurones, 2019 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs)

Zahurones was charged with several drug-related counts along with resisting an officer and physical abuse of a child. All the counts arose out of a single encounter with the police. She ultimately pleaded to four counts. On three of those counts she got probation, but on Count 2–the felony child-abuse count–she entered a deferred-judgment agreement with the state. The court put her on a signature bond with respect to that last count, since she wouldn’t otherwise be supervised. Over the next couple of years, Zahurones spent a total of about 9 months in jail on probation holds. Ultimately both the probation and the deferred-judgment agreement were revoked. So, does she get credit for those probation holds against her sentence on Count 2, even though she was technically on a signature bond for that count when she was in jail?

State v. Richard H. Harrison Jr., 2017AP2440 & 2441-CR, cross-petitions for review granted 8/14/19; case activity

We posted about the unpublished court of appeals decision; the basic scenario is that Mr. Harrison served his initial confinement on a couple of concurrent sentences, then began serving the initial confinement portion of some sentences that had been imposed consecutive to that first set of sentences. But, about three years into those later sentences, they were vacated. So what happens to the three years Harrison was in prison on sentences that no longer exist? Do they count toward satisfying the extended supervision of his still-extant, earlier-imposed sentences?

State v. Casey M. Fisher, 2017AP868, District 1, 3/26/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Fisher’s § 974.06 postconviction motion clears the hurdle erected by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), but fails on the merits.

State v. Danny L. Wilber, 2016AP260, 12/26/18, District 1 (not recommend for publication); case activity (including briefs)

“This case involves a dual tragedy: the death of one innocent man and the conviction of another.” (Initial Brief at 1). Not one of the many eyewitnesses to this homicide, which occurred during a large house party, saw Wilber shoot Diaz, the deceased. In fact, Diaz was shot in the back of the head and fell face first toward Wilber, not away from him. The State’s theory was that the shot spun Diaz around causing him to fall toward the shooter. It offered no expert to prove that this was possible.

State v. Jose A. Reas-Mendez, 2017AP2452-CR, 12/11/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In 2017, conservative activists on SCOW overruled a 12-year-old, unanimous opinion in order to overwrite the plain language of §974.07(7), Wisconsin’s postconviction DNA testing statute. They made it virtually impossible for a defendant to get this type of testing. See State v. Denny, 2017 WI 17 and our post about it. This court of appeals decision toes the line. It may be summed as: Let the conviction stand.

State v. Howard D. Davis, 2017AP942-CR, District 1, 12/11/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Davis claimed trial counsel was ineffective in various ways, and that a juror may have introduced extraneous information into deliberations. The trial court denied his claims without a hearing. The court of appeals affirms.