On Point: 3. 973.155, sentence credit

State v. Michael K. Fermanich, 2023 WI 48, 6/14/23, reversing a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The key takeaway here is that five justices reaffirm and apply State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, and hold that Fermanich is entitled to 433 days sentence credit for time he spent in custody in connection with Oneida County charges that were dismissed and read-in at his Langlade County sentencing. (Opinion, ¶2). A concurrence by Justice Dallet is worth reading as a preemptive response to the dissent’s answer to the question for which the court granted review: whether State v. Tuescher should be reexamined and limited to the unique circumstances present there. A dissent by Chief Justice Ziegler and R.G. Bradley would have overruled Floyd, denied Fermanich credit under Tuescher, and required him to return to custody for an additional 433 days. (See Op., ¶19, Dallet, concurring).

State v. Joseph L. Slater, 2021 WI App 88; case activity (including briefs)

Slater had a prison sentence imposed and then stayed in favor of probation. While on probation, he was arrested on three new charges. The department of corrections revoked his probation pretty quickly, but he didn’t get sent to prison: instead, he remained in the county jail for over three years while those new charges were pending. After a jury convicted him on on the new charges, he got three new concurrent prison sentences. The court of appeals now holds that Slater should be credited on those new sentences for the years he spent in jail awaiting trial.

State v. Cesar Antonio Lira, 2019AO691-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity

Issues presented (from the State’s PFR):

1. Under §973.155, a convicted offender is entitled to sentence credit for “all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed.” And §973.15(5) provides that an offender lawfully made available to another jurisdiction is entitled to credit for custody time in that jurisdiction “under the terms of s. 973.155.”

The court of appeals awarded Lira over 11 years of credit for custody in Oklahoma under §973.15(5), despite the fact that the Oklahoma sentence was not “in connection with” the Wisconsin offenses for which he was sentenced. It relied on State v. Brown, 2006 WI App 41, 289 Wis. 2d 823, 711 N.W.2d 708, which holds that courts determining credit under section 973.15(5) may not consider “the terms of s. 973.155,” including whether the custody in the other jurisdiction is “in connection with” the Wisconsin offense.

State v. Amy Joan Zahurones, 2019 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs)

Zahurones was charged with several drug-related counts along with resisting an officer and physical abuse of a child. All the counts arose out of a single encounter with the police. She ultimately pleaded to four counts. On three of those counts she got probation, but on Count 2–the felony child-abuse count–she entered a deferred-judgment agreement with the state. The court put her on a signature bond with respect to that last count, since she wouldn’t otherwise be supervised. Over the next couple of years, Zahurones spent a total of about 9 months in jail on probation holds. Ultimately both the probation and the deferred-judgment agreement were revoked. So, does she get credit for those probation holds against her sentence on Count 2, even though she was technically on a signature bond for that count when she was in jail?

State v. Richard H. Harrison Jr., 2017AP2440 & 2441-CR, cross-petitions for review granted 8/14/19; case activity

We posted about the unpublished court of appeals decision; the basic scenario is that Mr. Harrison served his initial confinement on a couple of concurrent sentences, then began serving the initial confinement portion of some sentences that had been imposed consecutive to that first set of sentences. But, about three years into those later sentences, they were vacated. So what happens to the three years Harrison was in prison on sentences that no longer exist? Do they count toward satisfying the extended supervision of his still-extant, earlier-imposed sentences?