On Point: 4. 973.19, sentence mod.

State v. Thatcher R. Sehrbrock, 2022AP2153-CR, 8/8/24, District IV (authored); case activity

Sehrbrock, convicted of robbery with use of force as PTAC, appeals the judgment of conviction and order denying his postconviction motion in which he challenged a condition of probation requiring that an ignition interlock device be installed on any motor vehicle that he owns or operates. He argued that the IID condition was unreasonable and its term was harsh and excessive. The COA affirms in a 2-1 decision.

State v. Robert M. Schueller, 2023AP1755-CR, 6/20/24, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity

In a decision recommended for publication, the court of appeals holds that advances in PTSD treatment constitute a new factor, where the sentencing court expressly relied on its understanding that Schueller’s PTSD was uncurable in determining his risk to the public and the term of his incarceration.

State v. Robert L. Noll, 2002 WI App 273

Issue: Whether a new-factor based motion to modify sentence may be rejected as untimely under § 973.19.

Holding: The motion invoked the trial court’s inherent authority to modify, and therefore § 973.19 and its 90-day deadline was inapplicable. ¶5. The two procedures are distinct. Under § 973.19 a defendant may within 90 days of sentence “assert[] an erroneous exercise of discretion based on excessiveness,

State v. Joseph Scaccio III, 2000 WI App 265, 240 Wis.2d 95
For Scaccio: Jim D. Scott

Issue: Whether Scaccio’s motion to modify a sentencing imposed after revocation was untimely because he failed to appeal the original judgment of conviction.

Holding/Analysis: The principle is readily stated — you can take a direct appeal of a sentence imposed after revocation — but a certain amount of elaboration is unfortunately required.