On Point: A. Type pf PCM

State v. Amy Joan Zahurones, 2019 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs)

Zahurones was charged with several drug-related counts along with resisting an officer and physical abuse of a child. All the counts arose out of a single encounter with the police. She ultimately pleaded to four counts. On three of those counts she got probation, but on Count 2–the felony child-abuse count–she entered a deferred-judgment agreement with the state. The court put her on a signature bond with respect to that last count, since she wouldn’t otherwise be supervised. Over the next couple of years, Zahurones spent a total of about 9 months in jail on probation holds. Ultimately both the probation and the deferred-judgment agreement were revoked. So, does she get credit for those probation holds against her sentence on Count 2, even though she was technically on a signature bond for that count when she was in jail?

State v. Richard H. Harrison Jr., 2017AP2440 & 2441-CR, cross-petitions for review granted 8/14/19; case activity

We posted about the unpublished court of appeals decision; the basic scenario is that Mr. Harrison served his initial confinement on a couple of concurrent sentences, then began serving the initial confinement portion of some sentences that had been imposed consecutive to that first set of sentences. But, about three years into those later sentences, they were vacated. So what happens to the three years Harrison was in prison on sentences that no longer exist? Do they count toward satisfying the extended supervision of his still-extant, earlier-imposed sentences?

State v. Casey M. Fisher, 2017AP868, District 1, 3/26/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Fisher’s § 974.06 postconviction motion clears the hurdle erected by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), but fails on the merits.

State v. Danny L. Wilber, 2016AP260, 12/26/18, District 1 (not recommend for publication); case activity (including briefs)

“This case involves a dual tragedy: the death of one innocent man and the conviction of another.” (Initial Brief at 1). Not one of the many eyewitnesses to this homicide, which occurred during a large house party, saw Wilber shoot Diaz, the deceased. In fact, Diaz was shot in the back of the head and fell face first toward Wilber, not away from him. The State’s theory was that the shot spun Diaz around causing him to fall toward the shooter. It offered no expert to prove that this was possible.

State v. Jose A. Reas-Mendez, 2017AP2452-CR, 12/11/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In 2017, conservative activists on SCOW overruled a 12-year-old, unanimous opinion in order to overwrite the plain language of §974.07(7), Wisconsin’s postconviction DNA testing statute. They made it virtually impossible for a defendant to get this type of testing. See State v. Denny, 2017 WI 17 and our post about it. This court of appeals decision toes the line. It may be summed as: Let the conviction stand.

State v. Howard D. Davis, 2017AP942-CR, District 1, 12/11/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Davis claimed trial counsel was ineffective in various ways, and that a juror may have introduced extraneous information into deliberations. The trial court denied his claims without a hearing. The court of appeals affirms.

State v. Steven L. Buckingham, 2017AP1852-CR, 12/4/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication), case activity (including briefs).

When the court of appeals’ dismisses an appellant’s arguments on the grounds that they are “conclusory,” it’s always wise to check the briefs. In this case,  Buckingham filed a fully-developed, well-organized 42-page brief in chief presenting 5 claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and a claim for post-conviction discovery.

State v. Rafael D. Newson, 2018AP551, 9/18/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Newson claims that his trial and postconviction lawyers were ineffective for failing to raise lack of jurisdiction caused by the State’s failure to file its complaint against him before he was extradited to Arizona. He also argued that the Escalona bar should not apply given that he was in Arizona at the time of his direct appeal and his first two postconviction motions. The court of appeals did not bite on either.

State v. Darrick L. Bennett, 2016AP2209-CR, 9/18/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Bennett was charged with 1st degree intentional homicide, but pled guilty to 1st degree reckless homicide. In a decision turning on facts specific to this case, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision denying (a) plea withdrawal without a hearing, (b) sentence modification based on a new factors, and (c) postconviction discovery of evidence that might have affected his sentence.

Defense attorneys hear an awful lot about the “importance of finality” in criminal cases–especially at the §974.06 stage of proceedings. What about the victims? What about the waste of additional judicial resources? There must be a stopping point! Do those arguments really make sense if the wrong person was convicted? The latest edition of The Marshall Project highlights data showing that wrongful convictions result in tens to hundreds of thousands of additional felonies and violent crimes per year.