On Point: A. Probation

State v. Larry C. Lokken, 2017AP2087-CR, 9/17/19, District 3 (unpublished), case activity (including briefs)

Lokken, a long-time Eau Claire County Treasurer, pled “no contest” to 3 counts of misconduct in office and 5 counts of theft in a business setting for stealing $625,758.22 from taxpayers.  The circuit court ordered $681,846.92 in restitution  and imposed an unusual condition of probation on one of the counts: if Lokken failed to pay restitution in 4 1/2 years, the 10-year probation period  on Count 2 would be revoked.

State v. Dennis L. Schwind, 2019 WI 48, affirming a court of appeals’ summary disposition in 2017AP141-CR, 5/3/19; case activity (including briefs).

Section 973.09(3)(d) gives circuit courts authority to reduce or terminate a term of probation if 6 requirements are met. Schwind did not proceed under that statute because he couldn’t satisfy the requirements. So he argued that circuit courts also have inherent authority to reduce or terminate a term of probation for cause.  State v. Dowdy, 2012 WI 12, left this question open. This 5-2 opinion shuts it: No, circuit courts don’t have that authority.

Robert W. Huber v. Gloria Anderson, et al., 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 17-1302 (Nov. 26, 2018)

Though not directly related to the day-to-day practice of criminal law, this decision may be of interest, if only for its holding regarding the time limits for a person to sue DOC based on claims it improperly kept the person in prison or on supervision.

State v. Daniel E. Olsen, 2017AP918-CR, District 4, 1/25/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including respondent’s brief)

At the request of DOC, the circuit court extended Olsen’s probation by one year and increased his monthly restitution payment. His challenges to the court’s orders fail. 

State v. Marguerite Alpers, 2015AP1784-CR, 1/12/16, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering Alpers to install an ignition interlock device “on [her] husband’s car” as a condition of probation in her OWI cases because the record didn’t establish the condition was a reasonable and appropriate means of advancing the goals of rehabilitation and public protection, State v. Miller, 2005 WI App 114, 11, 283 Wis. 2d 465, 701 N.W.2d 47.

State v. Millard Reno Bandy, Sr., 2014AP1055-CR & 2014AP1056-CR, District 1, 10/28/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP1055-CR; 2014AP1056-CR

A defendant’s history of domestic violence against a victim provided a basis for trial court to increase the period of probation under § 973.09(2)(a)1.b. even though the offenses for which the defendant was placed on probation didn’t involve physical harm or a direct threat to the victim.

State v. Aaron S. Loos, 2012AP2154-CR, District 3, 5/14/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Though Loos was convicted of one misdemeanor and one felony at the same time, the maximum one-year term of probation for the misdemeanor under § 973.09(2)(a)1r. could not be increased by one year under § 973.09(2)(b)2. That statute may be applied only to increase the maximum term of probation on a felony conviction,

State v. John R. Edwards, 2013 WI App 51; case activity

The longer period of probation applicable to a misdemeanor act of domestic abuse under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(2)(a)1.b. may be ordered even though the charging documents did not allege the crime was an act of domestic abuse.

Edwards was charged with substantial battery, strangulation and suffocation, and disorderly conduct based on an incident with his live-in girlfriend.

State v. Justin L. Garrett, Case No. 12AP1341-CR, District 2, 12/19/12

Court of appeals decision (1 judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Garrett failed to make a prima facie showing that his plea colloquy was defective, so his motion to withdraw plea was properly denied without an evidentiary hearing:

¶10      Garrett argues that he did not understand the meaning of the specific elements of the charge of fourth-degree sexual assault: sexual contact and consent.  

Wisconsin State v. Tally Ann Rowan, 2012 WI 60, on certification review ; case activity

Extended Supervision Conditions – Suspicionless Searches 

A condition of extended supervision “that allows any law enforcement officer to search [Tally]’s person, vehicle, or residence for firearms, at any time and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion,” was tailored to the particular facts and thus neither overbroad nor unrelated to Tally’s rehabilitative needs.