On Point: A. Probation

State v. Matthew O. Roach, 2011AP2105-CR, District 4, 5/17/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Roach: Brandon Kuhl; case activity

Mootness Doctrine – Generally 

¶8 n. 2:

The State also contends that this issue is moot because the condition of probation Roach challenges expired on January 19, 2012.  An issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying controversy.  

State v. Tally Ann Rowan, 2010AP1398-CR, rev. granted 10/25/11

on certification request (District 3/4); for Rowan: LaZotte, Paul G.; case activity

Issue (from Certification): 

The issue presented by this appeal is whether a sentencing court violated the Fourth Amendment or Wis. Const. art. I, § 11, by setting a condition of extended supervision that allows any law enforcement officer to search the defendant’s person, vehicle,

certification; for Rowan: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; review granted, 10/25/11

Extended Supervision Conditions – Limits on Fourth Amendment Rights

The issue presented by this appeal is whether a sentencing court violated the Fourth Amendment or Wis. Const. art. I, § 11, by setting a condition of extended supervision that allows any law enforcement officer to search the defendant’s person,

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Luckett: Cheryl A. Ward; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Extended Supervision Conditions
ES condition barring Luckett from residing”with any person in any place in which children or women reside [without] Court’s permission” neither unreasonable nor unconstitutionally overbroad.

The court of appeals stresses that Luckett’s history “demonstrates domestic violence”; indeed, the immediate crime is itself DV-related.

court of appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication); BiC; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

Conditional Jail Time
“Applying the plain language of § 973.09(4)(a), it is clear that straight confinement time may be imposed as a condition of probation, and that although the trial court ‘may grant’ work-release privileges, it is not required to do so.” It follows that such privileges may be revoked,

State v. Glenn F. Schwebke, 2001 WI App 99, 242 Wis. 2d 585, 627 N.W.2d 213, affirmed on other grds., 2002 WI 55
For Schwebke: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School

Issue/Holding: The remedy for this sentence which exceeded the permissible maximum — multiple counts of probation running consecutive to one another, ¶¶25-30 — is to commute the excess portion to the total allowable term of probation.

State v. James E. Gray, 225 Wis.2d 39, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999), affirming unpublished decision
For Gray: Helen M. Mullison

Issue/Holding: Gray was originally convicted of three counts. On postconviction motion, the trial court vacated and dismissed with prejudice one count for lack of proof, and ordered a new trial on a second count. The third count conviction, for which Gray had received probation, remained viable. However,