On Point blog, page 3 of 7
Defendant not entitled to sentence credit for charges dismissed but not read in
State v. Demario D. Fleming, 2017AP1851-CR, District 1, 7/17/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Applying its recent decision in State v. Piggue, 2016 WI App 13, 366 Wis. 2d 605, 875 N.W.2d 663, the court of appeals rejects Fleming’s request for sentence credit for time he spent in custody on charges that were dismissed, but not read in, as part of a plea agreement.
Probation extension passes due process muster
State v. Daniel E. Olsen, 2017AP918-CR, District 4, 1/25/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including respondent’s brief)
At the request of DOC, the circuit court extended Olsen’s probation by one year and increased his monthly restitution payment. His challenges to the court’s orders fail.
Defense win: Person revoked from ES entitled to sentence credit until return to prison
State v. Larry Davis, 2017 WI App 55; case activity (including briefs)
Applying § 304.072(4) and State v. Presley, 2006 WI App 82, 292 Wis. 2d 734, 715 N.W.2d 713, the court of appeals holds that a person who is revoked from extended supervision resumes serving his sentence when he is received in the prison system, not when revocation occurs; he is therefore entitled to sentence credit up to the date he returns to prison.
Court rejects claim that revocation hearing lawyer was ineffective
State ex rel. Vincent Martinez v. Brian Hayes, 2014AP2095, District 2, 12/21/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Martinez claimed the lawyer who represented him at his ES revocation hearing should have objected to certain hearsay evidence and to the ALJ’s failure to find good cause for the lack of appearance of certain witnesses. The court of appeals rejects the claim because even if counsel was deficient, Martinez wasn’t prejudiced.
Court of Appeals rejects constitutional challenges to juvenile’s life sentence
State v. Antonio D. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)
Barbeau killed his great-grandmother when he was 14 years old, and eventually pled no contest to first-degree intentional homicide, which carries an automatic life sentence. When imposing such a sentence, the court must make a decision as to extended supervision: it can either deny any possibility of ES, or it can set a date at which the person becomes eligible, though such date must occur after the person has served at least 20 years. Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1g).
State ex rel. Antjuan Redmond v. Brian Foster, 2014AP2637, certification granted 6/15/16
On review of a court of appeals certification; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (from certification)
Whether an offender whose parole and extended supervision was revoked after a revocation hearing has an adequate remedy other than a writ of habeas corpus to pursue a claim that the attorney who represented him during the hearing rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance? Specifically, must the offender raise a claim of ineffective assistance of revocation counsel in a motion to the division of hearings and appeals (DHA) in the department of administration?
SCOTUS rejects “special circumstances” exception to PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
Ross v. Blake, USSC No. 15-339, 2016 WL 3128839 (June 6, 2016), vacating and remanding Blake v. Ross, 787 F.3d 693 (4th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
The Supreme Court unanimously holds there is no unwritten “special circumstances” exception to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act’s requirement that a prisoner exhaust administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit.
Court of Appeals asks SCOW to decide how to raise claims that counsel at revocation hearing was ineffective
State ex rel. Antjuan Redmond v. Brian Foster, 2014AP2637, District 2, 4/27/16, certification granted 6/15/16, certification vacated and case returned to the court of appeals 9/15/16; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Whether an offender whose parole and extended supervision was revoked after a revocation hearing has an adequate remedy other than a writ of habeas corpus to pursue a claim that the attorney who represented him during the hearing rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance? Specifically, must the offender raise a claim of ineffective assistance of revocation counsel in a motion to the division of hearings and appeals (DHA) in the department of administration?
Record didn’t support order to install ignition interlock on spouse’s car
State v. Marguerite Alpers, 2015AP1784-CR, 1/12/16, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering Alpers to install an ignition interlock device “on [her] husband’s car” as a condition of probation in her OWI cases because the record didn’t establish the condition was a reasonable and appropriate means of advancing the goals of rehabilitation and public protection, State v. Miller, 2005 WI App 114, 11, 283 Wis. 2d 465, 701 N.W.2d 47.
SCOTUS: Federal PLRA requires fee recoupment for all pending cases, not just one at a time
Bruce v. Samuels, USSC No. 14-844, 2016 WL 112684 (January 12, 2016), affirming Pinson v. Samuels, 761 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) of the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis must pay 20% of his or her existing income toward the filing fee of a case he or she files until the fee is paid. The federal circuit courts were split when it came to applying this requirement to prisoners who owed fees for more than one case. Some treated the 20% as a cap, so that the 20% would be taken out and applied to one case at a time till each fee was paid. Others assessed 20% per case, so that an inmate with, for example, three filing fees to pay would have 60% of his or her income taken. The Supreme Court unanimously adopts the second approach.