On Point: 31. Probation/ES

Question presented:

Is there a common law “special circumstances” exception to the Prison Litigation Reform Act that relieves an inmate of his mandatory obligation to exhaust administrative remedies when the inmate erroneously believes that he satisfied exhaustion by participating in an internal investigation?

Question presented:

When a prisoner files more than one case or appeal in the federal courts in forma pauperis, does 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) cap the monthly exaction of filing fees at 20% of the prisoner’s monthly income regardless of the number of cases or appeals for which he owes filing fees?

Coleman v. Tollefson, USSC No. 13-1333, 2015 WL 2340838 (May 18, 2015), affirming Coleman v. Tollefson, 733 F.3d 175 (6th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Ordinarily, an indigent litigant may proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which allows the litigant to file a civil action without paying fees or certain expenses. But under the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, a “three strikes” provision precludes IFP status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated …, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). But what if the prisoner is appealing one of the “strikes” and the appeal is still pending; does it still count as a “strike”? “Yes,” answers a unanimous Supreme Court.

State v. Millard Reno Bandy, Sr., 2014AP1055-CR & 2014AP1056-CR, District 1, 10/28/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP1055-CR; 2014AP1056-CR

A defendant’s history of domestic violence against a victim provided a basis for trial court to increase the period of probation under § 973.09(2)(a)1.b. even though the offenses for which the defendant was placed on probation didn’t involve physical harm or a direct threat to the victim.

State v. Jack E. Hoppe, 2014 WI App 51; case activity

A sentencing court may not prohibit a defendant convicted of OWI from driving a motor vehicle as a condition of extended supervision when the length of extended supervision exceeds the maximum period for revoking operating privileges set by § 343.30.

State ex rel. Ardonis Greer v. Wayne J. Widenhoeft, 2014 WI 19, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity; Majority opinion:  Justice Ziegler; Dissent: Justice Bradley and C.J. Abrahamson

The DOC assured Greer his probation was over and issued a discharge certificate to that effect.  In truth, his probation term hadn’t yet expired.  So when he committed new crimes, the DOC revoked his probation.  The Majority rejects Greer’s claims that the DOC: (1) lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation, (2) denied due process, and (3) is subject to equitable estoppel.

Review of published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by On Point):

If the Department of Corrections erroneously issues a probationer a discharge certificate under 973.o9(5) before the probationary term expired, but later discovers the error and proceeds to revoke the probationer, did the Department lose jurisdiction over the probationer?

If the Department retained jurisdiction over the probationer, is it equitably estopped from revoking him for conduct occurring before the probationary term expired?

State v. Aaron S. Loos, 2012AP2154-CR, District 3, 5/14/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Though Loos was convicted of one misdemeanor and one felony at the same time, the maximum one-year term of probation for the misdemeanor under § 973.09(2)(a)1r. could not be increased by one year under § 973.09(2)(b)2. That statute may be applied only to increase the maximum term of probation on a felony conviction,

State v. John R. Edwards, 2013 WI App 51; case activity

The longer period of probation applicable to a misdemeanor act of domestic abuse under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(2)(a)1.b. may be ordered even though the charging documents did not allege the crime was an act of domestic abuse.

Edwards was charged with substantial battery, strangulation and suffocation, and disorderly conduct based on an incident with his live-in girlfriend.

State v. Justin L. Garrett, Case No. 12AP1341-CR, District 2, 12/19/12

Court of appeals decision (1 judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Garrett failed to make a prima facie showing that his plea colloquy was defective, so his motion to withdraw plea was properly denied without an evidentiary hearing:

¶10      Garrett argues that he did not understand the meaning of the specific elements of the charge of fourth-degree sexual assault: sexual contact and consent.