On Point: 34. Bear Arms, 2nd Am.

Village of Somerset v. Mark J. Hoffman, 2015AP140, District 3, 5/17/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Viewed through the interpretive prism mandated by § 66.0409(6), a local ordinance prohibiting “wander[ing] or stroll[ing] in an aimless manner” that is “not usual for law abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons” isn’t violated by a person walking around with a loaded semi-automatic rifle slung over his shoulder and a loaded handgun in a holster on his hip.

Jaime Caetano v. Massachusetts, USSC No. 14-10078, 2016WL1078932 (per curiam), vacating Commonwealth v. Caetano, 470 Mass. 774, 26 N.E.2d 688 (2015); SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Jaime Caetano obtained a stun gun in order to protect herself from an abusive boyfriend. When she was prosecuted for violating a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the possession of stun guns, she argued that the law violated her 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled against her. SCOTUS, in one fell swoop, granted her cert petition and reversed. Here is the meat of its two-page per curiam opinion:

Tempest Horsley v. Jessica Trame, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 14-2846, 12/14/15

Illinois law requires a person over the age of 18 but under the age of 21 to get a parent’s or guardian signature on an application for a firearm owner’s identification (FOID) card, which is generally necessary to lawfully possess or acquire a firearm. The Seventh Circuit rejects the challenge an 18-year-old brought against the law under the Second Amendment and District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

The court of appeals’ decision in State v. Herrmann, which held that Wisconsin’s switchblade prohibition can’t be applied to a possession in a person’s home, has been attracting attention around the World Wide Web. Jurist’s Paper Chase has a news item. The Volokh Conspiracy has a post, and some sites focused on the right to keep and bear knives noted the decision, too (e.g.

State v. Cory S. Herrmann, 2015 WI App 97; case activity (including briefs)

In light of the Second Amendment decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), Wisconsin’s prohibition on the possession of a switchblade knife, § 941.24(1), is unconstitutional as applied to a person who possesses a switchblade in his or her own home.

Question presented:

Does a misdemeanor crime with the mens rea of recklessness qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” as defined under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9)?

United States v. Mariano A. Meza-Rodriguez, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3271, 8/20/15

While aliens who are in the United States without authorization may invoke the protections of the Second Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), which prohibits unauthorized aliens from possessing firearms, is a reasonable regulation of the right to bear arms. Thus, Meza-Rodriguez’s prosecution under the statute doesn’t violate the Second Amendment.

Steven Michael Leonard v. State of Wisconsin, 2015 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs) NOTE: This case’s analysis of whether DC is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is effectively overruled by Doubek v. Kaul, 2022 WI 31.

The court of appeals concludes that there’s no basis in the record for determining whether Leonard’s disorderly conduct conviction qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under the federal firearm prohibition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), and therefore he is not barred from possessing a firearm under that statute. The court also holds that Leonard’s disorderly conduct “involv[ed] the use of” one of Leonard’s guns and therefore § 968.20(1m)(b) bars the return of that gun.

Henderson v. United States, USSC No. 13-1487, 2015 WL 2340840 (May 18, 2015), reversing  United States v. Henderson, Case No. 12-14628, 2014 WL 292169 (11th Cir. 2014) (unreported); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court unanimously holds that a defendant convicted of a felony retains “a naked right of alienation” in any firearms he or she owns and therefore may arrange for a court-supervised sale or transfer the guns without violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)’s ban on possession of a firearm.

Question presented:

Does a felony conviction extinguish all of a defendant’s property interests in a firearm, such that he or she may not even arrange for the sale or other transfer of any surrendered or seized firearms to another person because doing so would constitute “constructive” possession and thus violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)’s ban on possession of a firearm?