On Point blog, page 1 of 96
COA dismisses appeal related to remedial sanction for contempt of court for nonparty in CHIPS case
Manitowoc County HSD v. K.H., 2024AP1717, District II, 12/23/25, 1-judge decision ineligible for publication; case activity (including briefs)
COA dismisses as moot an appeal from the circuit court’s order that resulted in K.H. serving 20 days of a remedial sanction for contempt of court.
COA confirms that restitution statute providing defendant may raise “any” defense available in a civil action does not include contributory negligence
State v. David T. Waits, 2023AP1592 and 2023AP1593, 12/23/25, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA affirmed an award of restitution to the victim of a hit and run although the defendant was not allowed to introduce evidence of the victim’s contributory negligence and the victim’s preexisting conditions aggravated her injuries.
COA holds plea questionnaire and waiver of counsel forms insufficient to shift burden for collateral attack
State v. Matthew John Flynn, 2024AP2306-CR, 12/17/25, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
Flynn appeals his operating while intoxicated, third offense, conviction and an order denying his collateral attack motion. He argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion because he alleged sufficient facts to suggest that the prior conviction did not rest upon a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. COA affirms.
COA resolves recurring challenge to DV enhancer, rejects reliance on Rector, and applies definition of “separate occasions” from prior case law
State v. Brian Tyrone Ricketts, Jr., 2024AP2291-CR, 12/9/25, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
Following on the heels of the recent litigation as to the meaning of “separate occasions” that reached SCOW in the Rector case, COA holds that two charges in the same case constitute “separate occasions” for the purposes of the domestic abuse repeater.
COA critiques Gramza but extends its holding to apply to § 973.195 petitions for sentence adjustment
State v. Angela R. Joski, 2023AP1371-CR, 10/29/25, District II (recommended for publication); case activity
The state appealed Joski’s early release under Wis. Stat. § 973.195, arguing that pursuant to State v. Gramza, 2020 WI App 81, ¶24, 395 Wis. 2d 215, 952 N.W.2d 836, Joski must fully serve the mandatory minimum three-year term of initial confinement prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 346.65. COA agrees due to Gramza‘s interpretation, and reverses.
COA calculates discharge date on sentences for crimes committed between 1999 and 2003 in published case.
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Christopher P. Kawleski v. State, 2022AP1129, 7/3/25, District IV, (recommended for publication); case activity
COA recommends publication in a case addressing how to calculate the maximum discharge date for a defendant sentenced to a bifurcated sentence on a felony between 1999 and 2003 upon release from reconfinement after extended supervision was revoked.
Defense win: COA reverses parts of juvenile restitution order
State v. C.J.L., 2024AP1917, 7/3/25, District IV (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
C.J.L. contests part of the restitution ordered in his juvenile case related to a theft and break in at a dance studio–restitution for a surveillance subscription purchased after the theft, and for damages to the studio’s dance floor. Because the juvenile statute, Wis. Stat. § 938.34(5)(a), permits restitution for physical injury to a person or damage to property only, the COA agrees with C.J.L. and reverses the restitution order.
Seventh Circuit denies habeas petition because Supreme Court precedent was unclear whether de facto life sentence for juvenile considered capable of reform violated Eighth Amendment.
Curtis L. Walker v. Dan Cromwell, No. 23-2240, 6/16/25
Despite making a “strong case for relief” that his de-facto life sentence for a homicide committed when he was 17 violated the Eighth Amendment, the Seventh Circuit held that Curtis Walker’s habeas petition could not overcome the heavy burden imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to show that the state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court because the Court’s precedents were not “a model of clarity.”
COA addresses dual sentence credit when imposed and stayed sentence is lifted in case recommended for publication.
State v. Scott R. Dachelet, 2023AP970, 6/25/25, District II (recommended for publication); case activity
Wisconsin’s seemingly straightforward sentence credit statute – Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) – is required to accommodate an infinite variety of scenarios. Here, the COA addressed whether a defendant is entitled to sentence credit on a withheld sentence where probation was revoked while also receiving credit for an imposed and stayed sentence that was revoked. Because lifting the stay on the imposed and stayed sentence severed the connection between the defendant’s custody and the case for which his sentence was withheld, the Court found that he was not entitled to dual sentence credit.
Defense Win: COA finds exception to potential jurisdictional defect and reverses order denying early releasing following SAP completion
State v. Benny Burgos, 2024AP1497-CR, 6/3/25, District I (not recommended for publication); case activity
In an interesting appeal presenting questions of statutory construction and appellate jurisdiction, COA uses principles of equity to reach the merits and reverses in Burgos’s favor.