On Point

State of Wisconsin ex rel. Christopher P. Kawleski v. State, 2022AP1129, 7/3/25, District IV, (recommended for publication); case activity

COA recommends publication in a case addressing how to calculate the maximum discharge date for a defendant sentenced to a bifurcated sentence on a felony between 1999 and 2003 upon release from reconfinement after extended supervision was revoked.

State v. C.J.L.,  2024AP1917, 7/3/25, District IV (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

C.J.L. contests part of the restitution ordered in his juvenile case related to a theft and break in at a dance studio–restitution for a surveillance subscription purchased after the theft, and for damages to the studio’s dance floor. Because the juvenile statute, Wis. Stat. § 938.34(5)(a), permits restitution for physical injury to a person or damage to property only, the COA agrees with C.J.L. and reverses the restitution order.

State v. Daniel J. Rejholec, 2023AP2192-CR, 5/28/25, District II (recommended for publication); case activity

In a consequential appeal, COA holds that allocution statements are admissible evidence after a plea has been withdrawn.

State v. Thatcher R. Sehrbrock, 2022AP2153-CR, 8/8/24, District IV (authored); case activity

Sehrbrock, convicted of robbery with use of force as PTAC, appeals the judgment of conviction and order denying his postconviction motion in which he challenged a condition of probation requiring that an ignition interlock device be installed on any motor vehicle that he owns or operates. He argued that the IID condition was unreasonable and its term was harsh and excessive. The COA affirms in a 2-1 decision.

Erlinger v. United States, USSC No. 23-370, June 21, 2024, vacating United States v. Erlinger, 77 F.4th 617 (7th Cir. 2023); Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)

Whether offenses committed on three “occasions different from one another” for purposes of federal Armed Career Criminal Act must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Andre L. Jones, 2023AP1535-CR, 2023AP1536-CR, 2023AP1537-CR and 2023AP1538-CR, 5/16/24, District IV(not recommended for publication); case activity

In a rare appeal of an order denying a motion for return of property, COA rejects a novel statutory construction argument by adhering to what it views as binding precedent.

State v. Jonathon S. Geiger, 2022AP1270-CR, District III, 7/11/23, not recommended for publication; case activity (briefs available)

Geiger argues the circuit court erroneously ordered him to pay extradition costs in connection with a sentencing after revocation hearing. COA rejects his statutory construction arguments and affirms.

State v. Tracy Laver Hailes, 2021AP1339-CR, 5/9/23, District 1, (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In a decision recommended for publication, the court of appeals holds that under §973.01(2)(c) a circuit court may apply either §939.62(1) (governing habitual criminality) or §961.48 (governing second or subsequent offenses) to enhance a penalty, but it may not apply both. While the circuit court erroneously applied both enhancers in this case, the court of appeals nevertheless denied Hailes’s claims for plea withdrawal, sentence modification, and resentencing.

State v. James J. Socha, 2021AP1083-CR & 2021AP2116-CR, District 1, 4/25/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs): 2021AP1083-CR; 2021AP2116-CR

The fact that some of Socha’s prior OWI offenses have been lawfully vacated since he was sentenced may constitute a new factor justifying sentence modification, so the circuit courts erred in denying Socha’s motions for sentence modification without a hearing.

State ex rel. DeLorean Bryson v. Kevin Carr, 2022 WI App 34; case activity (including briefs)

A few months ago the court of appeals decided Ortiz v. Carr, holding (with a number of important caveats) that DOC may not take a greater percentage of an inmate’s wages for restitution than the circuit court has ordered–if the circuit court has ordered a specific percentage. Here, the court applies similar logic to obligations other than restitution. It holds that DOC has the authority to set a percentage rate for the crime lab surcharge and the DNA surcharge, but that the circuit court has the authority to set a different rate for collection of court fees. It does not decide who has authority over the victim-witness surcharge, because DOC did not appeal the circuit court’s determination of that question (which was that DOC has the authority to set the percentage, but that its new policy of taking 50 percent violates the administrative rules it earlier promulgated).