On Point blog, page 3 of 9
SCOW says circuit courts lack inherent authority to order destruction of inaccurate PSI
State v. Melton, 2013 WI 65, reversing published court of appeals decision; case activity; opinion by Justice Prosser; concurrence by Justice Ziegler and joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bradley
Melton pled guilty to 2 felonies, and the court ordered a PSI for sentencing. Turns out the PSI contained errors (info re uncharged offenses), so the court ordered a 2nd PSI and the destruction of the 1st PSI.
Judge’s invocations of religious deity were “ill-advised,” but do not show he imposed sentence based on religious considerations
State v. Robert J. Betters, 2013 WI App 85; case activity
When sentencing of Betters for child sexual assault, the judge stated that “every child is a gift from God,” and indicated Betters’s conduct toward the victims was “an abomination in the sight of God and in the sight of man, and … totally unacceptable.” ( ¶¶4, 15). The court of appeals rejects Betters’s claim that these references show the judge sentenced Betters based on religious considerations because the “offhand religious references”
U.S. Supreme Court: Ex Post Facto Clause limits application of new federal sentencing guidelines
Marvin Peugh v. United States, USSC No. 12-62, 6/10/13
United States Supreme Court decision, reversing United States v. Peugh, 675 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2012)
Resolving a split between federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court holds that a sentencing court violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by using the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing instead of the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense,
Wisconsin Supreme Court holds counsel in merit appeal may refer to PSI without asking permission from any court
In the Matter of State v. Michael Buchanan: State ex rel. Office of State Public Defender v. Wis. Court of Appeals, District IV, 2013 WI 31, on review of petition for supervisory writ; case activity
In an important decision for all lawyers who handle criminal cases in the state appellate courts, the supreme court affirms that counsel for the defendant and the state do not need permission from a court to use,
State v. Brandon M. Melton, 2012 WI App 95, WSC review granted 11/14/12
on review of published decision; case activity
Issue (composed by On Point)
Whether a circuit court has inherent authority to order destruction of a presentence investigation report (albeit under “unique facts”), after sentencing and entry of judgment.
And as to those unique facts? The PSI at issue contained information about uncharged offenses that the trial court determined “would be prejudicial to Melton as he went through the …
Marvin Peugh v. U.S., USSC No. 12-62, cert granted 11/9/12
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual directs a court to “use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced” unless “the court determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.” Eight courts of appeals have held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated where retroactive application of the Sentencing Guidelines creates a significant risk of a higher sentence.
Presentence Report: Authority to Order Destruction
State v. Brandon M. Melton, 2012 WI App 95, WSC review granted 11/14/12(recommended for publication), supreme court review granted 11/14/12; case activity
Under “unique facts,” the circuit court possessed inherent authority to order destruction of a PSI: the PSI contained uncharged offenses irrelevant to sentencing whose inclusion was improper under DOC rules; and, though sealed, it coexisted with a second PSI in the court file:
¶22 The circuit court did not articulate any public policy reasons for rejecting Melton’s request to destroy the entire PSI report,
Sentencing Guidelines: No Remedy for Omitted Offense
State v. Jeffrey S. Firebaugh, 2011 WI App 154 (recommended for publication); pro se; case activity
Because the Wisconsin Sentencing Commission had created no guideline “applicable” to Firebaugh’s offense (homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle), he isn’t entitled to resentencing on the basis of failure to “consider” a (non-existent) guideline.
¶12 At the time of Firebaugh’s sentencing, neither the CPSC nor the Commission had developed a sentencing guideline for homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle.
State v. Mark W. Sterling, 2009AP815-CR, District I, 5/4/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Sterling: Dianne M. Erickson; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Charging Decision – Judicial Involvement
Increase in the charge, following trial judge’s veiled suggestion to the prosecutor that such an increase would be appropriate, wasn’t occasioned by judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion, ¶¶16-22.
Initially charged with first-degree reckless injury, Sterling was ultimately convicted on an amended charge of attempted first-degree intentional homicide.
Sentencing Guidelines: General Purpose – Retroactive Repeal, § 973.017(2)(a); Statutory Construction: § 990.04
State v. Thomas H.L. Barfell, 2010 WI App 61; for Barfell: Roberta A. Heckes; BiC; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.; App. Supp. Br.; Resp. Supp. Br.
Sentencing – Guidelines, General Purpose
¶7 While Barfell is correct that he “has a due process right ‘to be sentenced on the basis of true and correct information’ pertaining to ‘the offense and the circumstances of its commission … and the defendant’s personality,