On Point: C. Factors

State v. Donald W. Thexton, 2007 WI App 11, PFR filed 1/02/07
For Thexton: Kirk B. Obear

Issue/Holding: The agent’s use of a prior PSI during the interview of defendant for the current case did not trigger any additional right to counsel:

¶10      Thexton further argues that his right to counsel was violated because he was unable to consult with his attorney regarding the use of the prior PSI during the interview.

State v. Germaine M. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, affirming unpublished summary order
For Taylor: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶28 In terms of the length of his sentence, Taylor argues that there appeared to be no “starting point” for the court of some very low period of confinement, or even the period of confinement recommended by the PSI writer. We cannot agree.

State v. Donald Odom, 2006 WI App 145
For Odom: Eileen Miller Carter; J.C. Moore, SPD, Milwaukee Trial

Issue/Holding: Trial court’s acknowledgement that Odom had been a productive citizen but that his numerous crimes “stood in stark contrast to that past” adequately accounted for Odom’s “positive attributes,” ¶24.

State v. Donald Odom, 2006 WI App 145
For Odom: Eileen Miller Carter; J.C. Moore, SPD, Milwaukee Trial

Issue/Holding: A trial court is not required to follow the sentencing guidelines, but only to explain a departure; the trial court’s explanation for departure (defendant’s lengthy record and reoffending upon release from confinement) was an adequate explanation, ¶26.

State v. Jack W. Klubertanz, 2006 WI App 71, PFR filed 4/14/06
For Klubertanz: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶21      We conclude that the circuit court here properly exercised its sentencing discretion under the standards set forth in Gallion. The court identified the objectives it sought to achieve with the sentence it imposed: punishing Klubertanz, protecting the public,

State v. Chad W. Ziegler, 2006 WI App 49, PFR filed 3/13/06
For Ziegler: Kenneth P. Casey, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶23      The principal objectives of a sentence include, but are not limited to, the protection of the community, the punishment of the defendant, rehabilitation of the defendant, and deterrence to others. Id., ¶40. A sentencing court should indicate the general objectives of greatest importance and explain how,

State v. Germaine M. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, affirming unpublished summary order
For Taylor: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶17        The standards governing appellate review of an imposed sentence are well settled. [9] A circuit court exercises its discretion at sentencing, and appellate review is limited to determining if the court’s discretion was erroneously exercised.

…

¶27      All told,

State v. Steven A. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26
For Harvey: Christopher William Rose

Issue/Holding:

¶47      Harvey correctly states Gallion’s teaching that probation should be considered as the first sentencing alternative. Gallion, 270 Wis.  2d 535, ¶25. Here, the trial court expressly addressed probation. … In sum, the court concluded that probation would unduly depreciate the offense. …

¶48      Probation should be the disposition unless confinement is necessary to protect the public,

State v. Donald Odom, 2006 WI App 145
For Odom: Eileen Miller Carter; J.C. Moore, SPD, Milwaukee Trial

Issue/Holding: Trial court’s discussion of the three primary sentencing factors was adequate, though the court did not explicitly identify those factors, ¶25.

State v. Jeremy D. Russ, 2006 WI App 9
For Russ: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶14      This court observes a strong policy of deferring to the sentencing discretion of a trial court, presuming the sentence to be reasonable unless the defendant can demonstrate from the record that the court acted unreasonably. State v. Mosley, 201 Wis. 2d 36,