On Point blog, page 1 of 2
SCOW says circuit courts lack inherent authority to order destruction of inaccurate PSI
State v. Melton, 2013 WI 65, reversing published court of appeals decision; case activity; opinion by Justice Prosser; concurrence by Justice Ziegler and joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bradley
Melton pled guilty to 2 felonies, and the court ordered a PSI for sentencing. Turns out the PSI contained errors (info re uncharged offenses), so the court ordered a 2nd PSI and the destruction of the 1st PSI.
Wisconsin Supreme Court holds counsel in merit appeal may refer to PSI without asking permission from any court
In the Matter of State v. Michael Buchanan: State ex rel. Office of State Public Defender v. Wis. Court of Appeals, District IV, 2013 WI 31, on review of petition for supervisory writ; case activity
In an important decision for all lawyers who handle criminal cases in the state appellate courts, the supreme court affirms that counsel for the defendant and the state do not need permission from a court to use,
State v. Brandon M. Melton, 2012 WI App 95, WSC review granted 11/14/12
on review of published decision; case activity
Issue (composed by On Point)
Whether a circuit court has inherent authority to order destruction of a presentence investigation report (albeit under “unique facts”), after sentencing and entry of judgment.
And as to those unique facts? The PSI at issue contained information about uncharged offenses that the trial court determined “would be prejudicial to Melton as he went through the …
Presentence Report: Authority to Order Destruction
State v. Brandon M. Melton, 2012 WI App 95, WSC review granted 11/14/12(recommended for publication), supreme court review granted 11/14/12; case activity
Under “unique facts,” the circuit court possessed inherent authority to order destruction of a PSI: the PSI contained uncharged offenses irrelevant to sentencing whose inclusion was improper under DOC rules; and, though sealed, it coexisted with a second PSI in the court file:
¶22 The circuit court did not articulate any public policy reasons for rejecting Melton’s request to destroy the entire PSI report,
State v. Mark W. Sterling, 2009AP815-CR, District I, 5/4/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Sterling: Dianne M. Erickson; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Charging Decision – Judicial Involvement
Increase in the charge, following trial judge’s veiled suggestion to the prosecutor that such an increase would be appropriate, wasn’t occasioned by judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion, ¶¶16-22.
Initially charged with first-degree reckless injury, Sterling was ultimately convicted on an amended charge of attempted first-degree intentional homicide.
Presentence Report — Bias of Author: Spouse of Another Agent Concurrently Responsible for Defendant’s Supervision
State v. Donald W. Thexton, 2007 WI App 11, PFR filed 1/02/07
For Thexton: Kirk B. Obear
Issue/Holding: The rule of State v. David W. Suchocki, 208 Wis. 2d 509, 561 N.W.2d 332 (Ct. App. 1997) (conflict of interest where PSI author married to defendant’s prosecutor) does not extend to situation where PSI author is married to another probation agent and both are jointly supervising the defendant:
¶5 We do not believe that the same inherent bias exists in the relationship between two supervising probation agents.
Presentence Report – Miranda Warnings
State v. Donald W. Thexton, 2007 WI App 11, PFR filed 1/02/07
For Thexton: Kirk B. Obear
Issue/Holding: Thexton wasn’t entitled to Miranda warnings “at the time the PSI was being prepared”:
¶8 Thexton also claims that Streekstra violated his Fifth Amendment rights when he interviewed him during the investigation. Thexton claims that Streekstra used the prior PSI as a basis for questioning him,
Presentence Report – Right to Counsel
State v. Donald W. Thexton, 2007 WI App 11, PFR filed 1/02/07
For Thexton: Kirk B. Obear
Issue/Holding: The agent’s use of a prior PSI during the interview of defendant for the current case did not trigger any additional right to counsel:
¶10 Thexton further argues that his right to counsel was violated because he was unable to consult with his attorney regarding the use of the prior PSI during the interview.
Presentence Report — Sentencing Factor, pre-Gallion – Generally
State v. Germaine M. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, affirming unpublished summary order
For Taylor: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶28 In terms of the length of his sentence, Taylor argues that there appeared to be no “starting point” for the court of some very low period of confinement, or even the period of confinement recommended by the PSI writer. We cannot agree.
Presentence Report — Use / Subsequent to Sentencing
State v. James L. Montroy, 2005 WI App 230
For Montroy: Jay E. Heit; Stephanie L. Finn
Issue/Holding:
¶14 Montroy also argues a new PSI is necessary because the inaccurate information will continue to prejudice him in the future. He cites Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.27 (Nov. 2002) for examples of the various uses for a PSI beyond sentencing. However, Wis. Stat. § 973.08(2) requires that the transcript of Montroy’s sentencing hearing be part of his record.