On Point: a. DNA

State v. Arthur Allen Freiboth, 2018 WI App 46; case activity (including briefs)

In light of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s May 2018 decisions in State v. Muldrow, 2018 WI 52, 381 Wis. 2d 492, 912 N.W.2d 74, and State v. Williams, 2018 WI 59, 381 Wis. 2d 661, 912 N.W.2d 373, the court of appeals now holds:

State v. Michael L. Cox, 2018 WI 67, 6/15/18, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

For years the DNA surcharge statute said that a court “shall” impose a surcharge on certain felony sex offenses and “may” impose a surcharge on any other felony offense. See § 973.046 (1g) and (1r) (2011-12). That changed in 2013 Wis. Act 20, §§ 2353 and 2354, which amended the statute to say a court “shall” impose a surcharge for all criminal convictions, including misdemeanors, committed on or after January 1, 2014. A unanimous supreme court holds that in making this change the legislature intended to eliminate a circuit court’s discretion to waive the surcharge by requiring the surcharge to be imposed in every case.

State v. Jamal L. Williams, 2016AP883-CR, 2018 WI 59, 5/30/18, reversing in part, a published court of appeals opinion, 2017 WI App 46, case activity (including briefs)

In a 5-0 opinion (Roggensack and A.W. Bradley did not participate) SCOW overruled two court of appeals decisions, State v. Elward and State v. Radaj, which had held that the §973.046  mandatory DNA surcharge violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. SCOW delved into the reasoning of both cases and found it “faulty.” It further held that a circuit court may consider a defendant’s opposition to paying restitution as part of his character or lack of remorse when choosing a sentence.

State v. Arthur Allen Freiboth, 2015AP2535-CR, District IV, 2/26/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

…[W]e certify the present appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide whether a defendant who was not advised at the time of the plea that he or she faced multiple mandatory DNA surcharges has grounds for plea withdrawal.

State v. Michael L. Cox, 2016AP1745-CR, certification granted 10/17/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from certification):

This case raises a single question: whether a sentencing court retains any discretion under Wis. Stat. § 973.046 (2015-16), to waive DNA surcharges for crimes committed after January 1, 2014.

State v. Jamal L. Williams, 2017 WI App 46, cross petitions for review granted 10/10/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point)

1. Is the imposition of a single mandatory $250 DNA surcharge an ex post facto violation with respect to a defendant who committed his offense when the surcharge was discretionary and who previously had provided a DNA sample in another case?

2. Is Jamal Williams entitled to resentencing because the circuit court sentenced him based on an improper factor, namely, the fact that Williams refused to stipulate to restitution for which he was not legally responsible?

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR, certification granted 9/12/17; case activity (including briefs). This is the second certification of this case; here’s the first.

Issue

In determining whether the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitutes “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) so that a court must advise a defendant about the surcharges before a valid plea may be taken, is the “intent-effects” test, as applied in State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, and State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786, to ex post facto claims, the same analysis that was applied in State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, to a plea withdrawal claim?

If the analysis is the same, should Radaj be overruled in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs?

We note that we previously certified the issue of whether multiple DNA surcharges constituted “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a), such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The supreme court declined to accept certification.

We certify again because, as explained below, the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs now suggests that the ex post facto analysis of Radaj, holding that multiple DNA surcharges are “punishment,” was incorrect.

State v. Michael L. Cox, 2016AP1745-CR, District 2, 8/29/17, certification granted 10/17/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 67; case activity (including briefs)

Issue certified

This case raises a single question: whether a sentencing court retains any discretion under Wis. Stat. § 973.046 (2015-16), to waive DNA surcharges for crimes committed after January 1, 2014.

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR; District 2, 6/28/17, certification granted 9/12/17, appeal voluntarily dismissed 2/22/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

In determining whether the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitutes “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) so that a court must advise a defendant about the surcharges before a valid plea may be taken, is the “intent-effects” test, as applied in State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, and State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786, to ex post facto claims, the same analysis that was applied in State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, to a plea withdrawal claim?

If the analysis is the same, should Radaj be overruled in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs?

We note that we previously certified the issue of whether multiple DNA surcharges constituted “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a), such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The supreme court declined to accept certification.

We certify again because, as explained below, the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs now suggests that the ex post facto analysis of Radaj, holding that multiple DNR surcharges are “punishment,” was incorrect.

State v. Jamal L. Williams, 2017 WI App 46, cross petitions for review granted 10/10/17, reversed in part and affirmed in part, 2018 WI 59; case activity (including briefs)

It’s looking like “DNA surcharge Day” in the District 2 court of appeals. Williams argued that because he had been ordered to provide a DNA sample and pay the $250 surcharge in a prior case, retroactive application of Wisconsin’s recent mandatory DNA surcharge statute in this case violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The court of appeals agreed.