On Point: 8. Boot camp/ERP

State v. Benny Burgos, 2024AP1497-CR, 6/3/25, District I (not recommended for publication); case activity

In an interesting appeal presenting questions of statutory construction and appellate jurisdiction, COA uses principles of equity to reach the merits and reverses in Burgos’s favor.

State v. Les Paul Henderson, 2023AP2079-CR, 5/31/24, District IV (not recommended for publication); case activity

Although Henderson fails to persuade COA that a JOC making him eligible for early release programming controls, he does live to fight another day given COA’s order that he receive a hearing at which time the circuit court will have to exercise its discretion to determine his eligibility.

State v. Jack B. Gramza, 2020 WI App 81; case activity (including briefs)

If an inmate serving the initial confinement (IC) portion of a bifurcated sentence completes the Substance Abuse Program (SAP), § 302.05(3)(c)2. mandates that the sentencing court “shall” modify the inmate’s sentence by converting the remaining period of IC to extended supervision (ES) so that the inmate is released from confinement to ES. The court of appeals holds this mandate doesn’t apply to an inmate who is serving a mandatory minimum term of IC for an OWI offense if the inmate hasn’t yet served the mandatory minimum term.

State v. Tiron Justin Grant, 2014AP2965-CR, District 1, 11/24/2015 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court serially takes up and rejects each of Grant’s challenges to his conviction, at trial, of possessing cocaine with intent to deliver, as well as the sentencing court’s denial of ERP/SAP and CIP eligibility.

State v. Johnny E. Miller, 2014AP1392-CR, 2/18/05, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Miller argued that the State breached its plea agreement with him when, at sentencing, it recommended that he be eligible for the Earned Release Program only after he served a specified period of prison time. The State, he claimed, impermissibly advocated a harsher sentence than recommended. The court of appeals rejected Miller’s argument because he and the State simply “did not have any agreement as to ERP eligibility.”

State v. Brandon M. Pokey, 2012AP2412-CR, District 2, 8/14/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

The sentencing court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it made Pokey, who was convicted of armed robbery of a bank, ineligible for the Earned Release Program. At sentencing the court based its decision on all of the required sentencing factors, not just on the seriousness of the offense,

State v. Jeremy D. Schladweiler, 2009 WI App 177
Pro se

Issue/Holding:

¶9        Commonly referred to as “boot camp,” the CIP is governed by Wis. Stat. § 302.045, which provides that “the [DOC] shall provide a challenge incarceration program for inmates selected to participate” after meeting the eligibility requirements for the program. Sec. 302.045(1). …

¶10      Once the trial court has made an eligibility determination,

State v. Antonio M. Hall, 2007 WI App 168

For Hall: Michael D. Kaiser

Issue/Holding:

¶17   From our examination of these statutory provisions, we find no ambiguity in the relevant language and conclude that the provisions of Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01(3g), 973.01(3m) and 302.113(9)(am) express a clear intent to restrict the sentencing discretion of the reconfinement court at a reconfinement hearing;

State v. Kathy J. Johnson, 2007 WI App 41
For Johnson: Jeremy Perri, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue: Whether DOC policy, for inmates under sentence commencing prior to July 26, 2003, to take no position on an ERP petition constitutes approval of the petition under Wis. Stat. § 302.05(3)(e).

Holding:

¶8        Wisconsin Stat. § 302.05(3)(e) governs inmate petitions for the determination of eligibility for the ERP for inmates sentenced prior to the effective date of § 302.05, 

State v. Jonathan Owens, 2006 WI App 75, PFR filed 4/4/06
For Owens: Dianne M. Erickson

Issue: Whether the sentencing court’s initial denial of ERP eligibility, seemingly on the improper basis of the defendant’s age, was a proper exercise of discretion where on motion for reconsideration the court “stated that it had intended to refer to Owens’s age regarding his eligibility for the Challenge Incarceration Program only [and] then explained why it had denied Owens’s participation in the ERP and denied the motion for reconsideration.”

Holding:

¶9        Owens complains that even though the trial court set forth an explanation for its sentence,