On Point: D. Type of punishment

Question presented:

Colorado, like many states, imposes various monetary penalties when a person is convicted of a crime. But Colorado appears to be the only state that does not refund these penalties when a conviction is reversed. Rather, Colorado requires defendants to prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence to get their money back.

The Question Presented is whether this requirement is consistent with due process.

State v. Terry C. Craig, Jr., 2016AP177-CR, District 4, 8/11/16 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Craig struck and shattered the left tail light on an old car but he did not put a baseball-sized hole or a 2 inch crack on the left of it. That was preexisting damage. The circuit court ordered him to pay restitution for it any way, and the court of appeals affirmed.

State v. Pagenkopf, 2015AP1855-CR, 7/21/16, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity  (including briefs)

Per §973.20(13)(c)4, a court commissioner held a hearing and submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that Pagenkopf pay $19,274.69 in restitution. Pagenkopf sought de novo review via §757.69(8), which provides that a “decision” by a court commissioner shall be reviewed by the circuit court upon the motion of any party.  According to the court of appeals, §757.69(8) does not apply to a commissioner’s restitution findings.

Question presented:

What are the jurisdictional prerequisites for appealing a deferred restitution award made during the pendency of a timely appeal of a criminal judgment imposing sentence, a question left open by the Court’s decision in Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010)?

Lester Ray Nichols v. United States, USSC No. 15-5238, 2016 WL 1278473, (April 4, 2016), reversing United States v. Nichols, 775 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In a unanimous opinion of limited impact, the Supreme Court holds that a prior version of SORNA did not require a registered sex offender to notify his state registration authority before moving out of the country.

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point):

Does the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws bar the mandatory imposition of a DNA surcharge for a single felony conviction based on conduct that was committed before the mandatory DNA surcharge requirement took effect?

City of Milwaukee v. D.S., 2015AP1634, 2/2/16, District 1 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

D.S., a juvenile, was ordered to register as a sex offender for life. On appeal, he argued that the circuit court relied on two types of inaccurate information: (1) a report, prepared by Dr. Paul Hesse, regarding the recidivism rate for juvenile sex offenders at Lincoln Hills, and (2) misinformation about the meaning of D.S.’s JSOAP-II scores.  He lost on both counts.

State v. Guadalupe Ronzon, 2015AP498, 1/26/16, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Ronzon challenges the restitution award in her conviction of failing to fulfill her Wis. Stat. § 346.67 duty upon striking a vehicle with her car.

As we wait on SCOW to decide the petition for review on State v. Scruggs, ASPD Peter Heyne offers some news and thoughts on DNA surcharges. On January 7, 2016, the court of appeals rejected a no-merit report in State v. Jeffrey J. Wickman noting that neither State v. Radaj nor State v. Scruggs “squarely addresses whether a mandatory DNA surcharge is appropriate in circumstances where the defendant has previously submitted a DNA sample. Rather, at this time, it remains an open question whether a mandatory DNA surcharge is punitive in effect when applied to a defendant who previously gave a DNA sample or paid a surcharge.” (Wickman at 6-7).

State v. Frank E. Pilarski, 2015AP425, District 2, 12/23/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Pilarski sexually assaulted a child in his in-home day care; the court of appeals upholds a restitution award for the child’s mother’s reduced work hours necessitated by her unwillingness to use any other in-home day care after the assaults.