On Point: D. Type of punishment

State v. Tommy Lee Branch, 2015 WI App 65; case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court had no authority to order cash seized from Branch on his arrest to be used to pay court obligations because there was no basis for concluding the money was not subject to return under § 968.20. As the court of appeals puts it, the cash Branch had at the time of his arrest was no different from any other personal property he had when arrested. “Had [Branch] been wearing a $200 Stetson hat, a $300 Gucci belt, or a pair of $500 Allen Edmonds shoes, the State would not be allowed to seize those items of personal property and sell them on eBay to pay Branch’s debts.” (¶10).

State v. Gregory Mark Radaj, 2015 WI App 50; case activity (including briefs)

A defendant who committed a felony before the effective date of the law mandating a $250 DNA surcharge for each felony conviction, but who is sentenced after that effective date, cannot be made to pay the surcharge on each felony conviction because that violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Instead, the defendant may only be subject to a single discretionary surcharge of $250.

State v. Garett T. Elward, 2015 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)

Defendants who committed a misdemeanor offense before April 1, 2015 January 1, 2014, cannot be made to pay the mandatory $200 DNA surcharge that is supposed to be imposed for each misdemeanor conviction beginning January 1, 2014, because imposition of the surcharge on that class of defendants violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. [See UPDATE below regarding the date change.]

State v. Chaz L. Brown, 2014AP1848-CR, District 3, 5/19/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A “midsummer night’s attempt at self-help debt collection” (¶2) led to Brown being charged with disorderly conduct and battery. He was acquitted of the battery charges based on his self-defense claim, but he was convicted of the DC. (¶¶2-5). Based on Brown’s conduct during the entire incident, there was sufficient evidence showing a causal connection between Brown’s DC and the battery victim’s damages to support the trial court’s restitution order.

State v. Richard J. Nelson, 2014AP1794-CR, District 3, 2/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

While the victim’s injuries could have been caused by the alleged conduct for which Nelson was acquitted, they could also have been the result of the conduct for which Nelson was convicted. Thus, there was a basis for finding a causal connection between Nelson’s conduct and the injuries and the circuit court properly ordered restitution.

State v. Johnny E. Miller, 2014AP1392-CR, 2/18/05, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Miller argued that the State breached its plea agreement with him when, at sentencing, it recommended that he be eligible for the Earned Release Program only after he served a specified period of prison time. The State, he claimed, impermissibly advocated a harsher sentence than recommended. The court of appeals rejected Miller’s argument because he and the State simply “did not have any agreement as to ERP eligibility.”

State v. Lance F., 2014AP1881-FT, 12/23/14, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

A circuit court lacks authority to order a juvenile (who had been found delinquent for battery, disorderly conduct and physical abuse of a child) to make restitution of the victim’s missing property, where he was never charged with theft of the property, he never admitted to stealing the property, and the state did not read in charges relating to theft of the property. The court explained:

State v. Timothy D. Russell, 2014AP451-CR, District 1, 12/23/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

When sentencing Russell for a series of thefts committed while he was deputy chief of staff to the Milwaukee County Executive, the circuit court referred to the charge to which Russell pled as “misconduct in public office, … not a theft as I think has been reported.” (¶8). The court of appeals holds that the sentencing transcript, when read as a whole, makes it clear that the circuit court did not erroneously believe it was sentencing Russell for the offense of misconduct in public office, but merely intended to note that Russell committed the offense of theft by virtue of his public position as deputy chief of staff to the Milwaukee County Executive.

State v. Leopoldo R. Salas Gayton, 2013AP646-CR, District 1, 10/7/14 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 11/4/15, affirmed, 2016 WI 58; case activity

The sentencing court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion by relying in part on Gayton’s immigration status or by failing to explain its reasons for imposing the maximum term of initial confinement and the DNA surcharge.

State v. Patrick L. Hibl, 2013AP2723-CR, District 2, 6/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Rejecting challenges to a restitution order, the court of appeals holds that the evidence in the record established a nexus between the crime Hibl was convicted of and the victim’s loss and that the circuit court took account of his ability to pay.