On Point: D. Type of punishment

State v. Derick G. Vanbeek, 2009 WI App 37, PFR filed 3/13/09
For Vanbeek: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: On conviction for making a false bomb scare, § 947.015, Vanbeek is liable in restitution to the school district for salaries and benefits paid to teachers and staff during the resulting 4-hour evacuation, because the school district was a “direct victim” of the crime.

State v. Alberto Fernandez, 2009 WI 29, on certification
For Fernandez: Eileen A. Hirsch, Shelley M. Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶52      The State counters that there is no language in the statute that requires victim claims to be submitted before sentencing. The State also argues that where restitution was held open, there is no expectation of finality and thus no equitable grounds for denying the claims.

State v. Derick G. Vanbeek, 2009 WI App 37, PFR filed 3/13/09
For Vanbeek: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: On conviction for making a false bomb scare, § 947.015, Vanbeek is liable in restitution to the school district for salaries and benefits paid to teachers and staff during the resulting 4-hour evacuation, because the school district lost the value of these employee’s services during that time.

State v. Todd W. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, PFR filed 6/24/09
For Berggren: Robert G. LeBell

Issue/Holding: The sentencing court need not state separately why it chooses consecutive rather than concurrent terms; rather, this determination is made by considering the same factors as inform sentence length, ¶¶45-46.

State v. Todd W. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, PFR filed 6/24/09
For Berggren: Robert G. LeBell

Issue/Holding: Sentence was based on proper exercise of discretion, including gravity of offense and defendant’s character and “long-term treatment needs,” ¶¶38-44.

State v. Jeremy D. Schladweiler, 2009 WI App 177
Pro se

Issue/Holding:

¶9        Commonly referred to as “boot camp,” the CIP is governed by Wis. Stat. § 302.045, which provides that “the [DOC] shall provide a challenge incarceration program for inmates selected to participate” after meeting the eligibility requirements for the program. Sec. 302.045(1). …

¶10      Once the trial court has made an eligibility determination,

State v. Jeremy T. Greene, 2008 WI App 100, PFR filed 7/14/08
For Greene: Kristen D. Schipper

Issue: Whether the sentencing court may order that DOC distribute “gifted” (as opposed to wage-based) funds in a prisoner’s account to satisfy a restitution obligation.

Holding:

¶12      We observe that Wis. Stat. § 973.20 does not limit the consideration of a defendant’s ability to pay out of funds derived from only earnings or wages. 

State v. Jeremy T. Greene, 2008 WI App 100, PFR filed 7/14/08
For Greene: Kristen D. Schipper

Issue/Holding: Restitution order amendment, directing DOC to disburse funds from the prisoner’s account, did not violate double jeopardy although the amendment occurred three years after the original order:

¶16      Greene’s double jeopardy argument focuses on the fact that DOC, in applying the original restitution order, did not distribute funds from his accounts to pay restitution in the three years prior to the entry of the amended restitution order.

State v. William Agosto, 2008 WI App 149, PFR filed 10/21/08
For Agosto: Andrea Taylor Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: The defendant’s mother, who posted subsequently-forfeited cash bail, is a “victim” for restitution purposes:

¶8        …

• Agosto committed the “crime” of bail-jumping. He pled guilty and the circuit court entered a judgment convicting him of that crime.
• As a result of that crime,

State v. Anthony Houston Lee, 2008 WI App 185
For Lee: Carl W. Chessir

Issue/Holding:

¶11      As noted, Wis. Stat. § 973.20 authorizes a trial court to order restitution to victims of a “[c]rime considered at sentencing,” which includes “any crime for which the defendant was convicted and any read-in crime.” Sec. 973.20(1g)(a) & (1r). We conclude that this language is clear and unambiguous, and that it requires us to reverse the restitution order.