On Point: D. Type of punishment

State v. Garren G. Gribble, 2001 WI App 227, PFR filed
For Gribble: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether, on a conviction for homicide of a child, the child’s mother and aunt could be considered victims within the meaning of § 973.20(1r) so as to support restitution for their counseling costs.

Holding: “Victim” in § 973.20(1r) is assigned the meaning of “victim”

State v. Troy B. Baker, 2001 WI App 100, 243 Wis. 2d 77, 626 N.W.2d 862
For Baker: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the county DHS, which paid out testing expenses for a sexual assault victim, may be considered for restitution purposes an “insurer, surety or other person who has compensated [the] victim.”

Holding: Because § 973.20(5)(d) permits restitution to a third party,

State v. Gabriel L. Ortiz, 2001 WI App 215
For Ortiz: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether restitution may be ordered under § 973.20 for overtime police costs.

Holding:

¶20. The collective effect of Schmaling and Howard-Hastings is the following. A governmental entity can, in the appropriate case, be a victim entitled to restitution. (Howard-Hastings).

State v. Glenn F. Schwebke, 2001 WI App 99, 242 Wis. 2d 585, 627 N.W.2d 213, affirmed on other grds., 2002 WI 55
For Schwebke: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School

Issue/Holding: The remedy for this sentence which exceeded the permissible maximum — multiple counts of probation running consecutive to one another, ¶¶25-30 — is to commute the excess portion to the total allowable term of probation.

State v. Tronnie M. Dismuke, 2001 WI 75, 244 Wis. 2d 457, 628 N.W.2d 791, reversing and remanding, 2000 WI App 198, 238 Wis. 2d 577, 617 N.W.2d 862
For Dismuke: Richard D. Martin, William S. Coleman, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate<

Issue: Whether a defendant may have to bear costs of being produced from prison for court appearances.

Holding:

¶4 We reverse.

State v. Ashley B. Steele, 2001 WI App 160, PFR filed 6/25/01
For Steele: Christopher William Rose

Issue: Whether sentencing eligibility for “boot camp” is determined by bright-line statutory guidelines, or by exercise of trial court discretion.

Holding:

¶12. While an offender must meet the eligibility requirements of Wis. Stat. § 302.045(2) to participate in the challenge incarceration program, pursuant to Wis.

State v. David W. Oakley, 2000 WI 37, 234 Wis. 2d 528, 609 N.W.2d 786, reversing State v. Oakley, 226 Wis. 2d 437, 594 N.W.2d 827 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Oakley: Timothy T. Kay

Issue: “(W)hether a circuit court may require payment of an old, unpaid fine that was imposed in a prior sentence as a condition of probation for a new conviction when violation of the condition of probation exposes the defendant to incarceration in county jail for more than six months.”

State v. David S. Leighton, 2000 WI App 156, 237 Wis.2d 709, 616 N.W.2d 126
For Leighton: Daniel Snyder

Issue/Holding:

¶55 WISCONSIN STAT. § 973.20, governing restitution in criminal cases, “provides that a trial court ‘shall order the defendant to make full or partial restitution under this section to any victim of a crime,’ when imposing a sentence or probation for any crime.” State v.

State v. Aaron Evans, 2000 WI App 178, 238 Wis.2d 411, 617 N.W.2d 220
For Evans: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the sentencing court may allow the department of corrections to determine the amount of restitution.

Holding: Delegating determination of restitution to DOC isn’t authorized by statute and is therefore inappropriate: “Restitution is a statutory process and where, as here, a court constructs its own procedure to determine and set restitution-and that procedure is not authorized by the applicable and controlling law,

State v. Carl Simonetto, 2000 WI App 17, 232 Wis.2d 315, 606 N.W.2d 275
For Simonetto: Christopher L. Hartley

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in holding open restitution until certain victims could be identified.

Holding: “Section 973.20(13)(c), Stats., creates a ninety-day maximum hold-open period for entry of restitution after a sentence is imposed.” ¶10. (Note: The holding is probably more limited than the quote implies.