On Point: 8. Collateral attack on priors

State v. Joseph J. Hammill, 2006 WI App 128
For Hammill: Patrick J. Stangl

Issue/Holding:

¶6        A defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction in an enhanced sentence proceeding only on the ground that the defendant was denied the constitutional right to counsel. …

¶7        Hammill argues that he made a prima facie showing that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel.

State v. Keith S. Krause, 2006 WI App 43
For Krause: Roger G. Merry

Issue/Holding: Because collateral attack on a prior conviction used as a sentencing enhancer is limited to denial of counsel, and because the right to counsel does not attach to a civil proceeding, a refusal revocation is not subject to collateral attack on its use as an OWI enhancer:

¶12      In an enhanced-penalty situation,

State v. Thomas A. Mikulance, 2006 WI App 69
Pro se

Issue/Holding: A “narrow” exception to the serial litigation bar of § 974.06(4) and State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 185, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994) is established by State v. Flowers, 221 Wis. 2d 20, 27, 586 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1998), which “applies only where the defendant files a motion alleging that the State has failed to prove the prior conviction necessary to sustain the habitual criminal status (by proof or by admission) or when the penalty imposed is longer than permitted by law for a repeater,” ¶¶1,

State v. Alan J. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, on certification
For Ernst: Jeffrey W. Jensen

Issue1: Whether violation of the standards mandated by State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194 ¶24, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997) for valid waiver of counsel supports a collateral attack on a prior conviction.
Holding1:

¶25      … For there to be a valid collateral attack,

State v. Robert C. Deilke, 2004 WI 104, reversing 2003 WI App 151, 266 Wis. 2d 274, 667 N.W.2d 867
For Deilke: Kelly J. McKnight

Issue: Whether a defendant’s successful challenge to a prior plea-bargain based conviction that is being used as an enhancer in a current proceeding amounts to a breach of that prior plea bargain so as to allow reinstatement of charges dismissed under it.

State v. Charles J. Burroughs, 2002 WI App 18
For Burroughs: William F. Mross

Issue: Whether the record sufficiently supports Burroughs’ guilty plea on a prior offense supporting his persistent offender status.

Holding: Because Burroughs doesn’t contest the fact that he was represented by counsel when he entered the plea to the prior offense, his right to challenge the plea is barred under State v.

State v. Lawrence P. Peters, 2001 WI 74, 244 Wis. 2d 470, 628 N.W.2d 797, reversing, 2000 WI App 154, 237 Wis. 2d 741, 615 N.W.2d 655
For Peters: Jane K. Smith

Issue: Whether Peters may, at his OAR-5th sentencing, collaterally attack his OAR-2d conviction, on the ground of denial of counsel.

Holding:

¶4 We view this case as falling within the right-to-counsel exception to the general rule against collateral attacks on prior convictions.

State v. David M. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, clarified on reconsideration, 2001 WI 6, on certification
For Hahn: Steven G. Bauer

Issue: “(W)hether the U.S. Constitution requires that an offender be permitted during an enhanced sentence proceeding predicated on a prior conviction to challenge the prior conviction as unconstitutional because the conviction was allegedly based on a guilty plea that was not knowing,