On Point: Persistent offender

Erlinger v. United States, USSC No. 23-370, June 21, 2024, vacating United States v. Erlinger, 77 F.4th 617 (7th Cir. 2023); Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)

Whether offenses committed on three “occasions different from one another” for purposes of federal Armed Career Criminal Act must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Michael Scott Long, 2009 WI 36, affirming in part and reversing in part unpublished opinion
For Long: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue/Holding: The “3-strike” persistent repeater enhancement, § 939.62(2m)(d), requires that the two prior strikes occur before the current felony and the 1st strike’s conviction date precede the 2nd strike’s violation date. Although Long’s two prior strikes occurred before the current felony,

State v. Michael D. Lewis, 2004 WI App 211
For Lewis: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding: Sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, as persistent repeater due to prior conviction for sexual assault of a child, on a current conviction for child enticement isn’t cruel / unusual punishment under the 8th amendment. ¶¶16-18.

State v. Richard W. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, affirming unpublished decision
For Delaney: Joseph R. Cincotta

Issue/Holding:

¶1 … Specifically, Delaney asks this court to determine whether Wis. Stat. § 939.62 (1999-2000) was properly applied to his already enhanced OWI offense under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(c), based on the existence of a past non-OWI offense, so as to enhance Delaney’s penalty twice for count one of his judgment of conviction.

State v. Donald R. Wield, 2003 WI App 179, PFR filed 8/28/03
For Wield: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The persistent repeater law, § 939.62(2m) is constitutional; State v. Radke, 2003 WI 7, 259 Wis. 2d 13, 657 N.W.2d 66, controls. ¶¶20-21.

State v. Alan R. Radke, 2003 WI 7, affirming 2002 WI App 146
For Radke: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶5. The precise question raised, therefore, is whether the “two strikes” law violates the Due Process Clause of either the United States or Wisconsin Constitution because it requires a greater penalty to be imposed on an offender convicted of a second Class B non-fatal child sexual assault than the statutes require to be imposed on an offender convicted of a second Class A felony homicide offense.

State v. Donald R. Wield, 2003 WI App 179, PFR filed 8/28/03
For Wield: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: In determining whether a prior conviction under a since-repealed statute is a serious child sex offense comparable to § 948.02(1) so as to invoke the persistent repeater law, the “elements only” test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) doesn’t apply: “Thus,

State v. Paul R. Maxey, 2003 WI App 94
For Maxey: Douglas I. Henderson

Issue/Holding: A sentence may be enhanced by both the general repeater provision of § 939.62(1)(b) (1999-2000) and § the specific repeat drug offender provision of § 961.48(2) (1999-2000), given the rationale of State v. Richard W. Delaney, 2003 WI 9:

¶14. In summary, the law of Wis.

State v. Leonard T. Collins, 2002 WI App 177
For Collins: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶2. We agree with Collins that Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(d) requires circuit courts to determine independently whether an out-of-state crime is comparable to a Wisconsin “serious felony,” even if the defendant admits that he or she is a persistent repeater. However, because we can conclude as a matter of law that “second degree murder”

State v. Charles J. Burroughs, 2002 WI App 18
For Burroughs: William F. Mross

Issue/Holding: Burroughs’ prior conviction in Alabama for assault with intent to murder is sufficiently comparable to attempted first degree intentional homicide so as to support exposure to persistent offender sentencing, § 939.62(2m)(c). ¶¶23-27.