On Point blog, page 5 of 9
State proved defendant made valid waiver of right to counsel in prior OWI case
State v. Casey D. Schwandt, 2013AP2775-CR, District 2, 4/23/14 (one judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Schwandt’s knowledge about both the role attorneys play and their specialized training showed he made a valid waiver of counsel in a prior OWI case, despite his claim he was unaware of what an attorney could do for him in the particular case in which he waived counsel.
Statutory summary suspension from Illinois counts as prior conviction under § 343.307(1)
State v. Akil C. Jackson, 2014 WI App 50; case activity
Under State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132, 330 Wis. 2d 1, 794 N.W.2d 213, Jackson’s statutory summary suspension in Illinois resulting from an OWI and PAC citation counts as a prior conviction under § 343.307(1) even though the citation was eventually dismissed.
Carter considered whether a prior suspension of operating privileges under the Illinois “zero tolerance” law should be counted as a prior conviction under § 343.307.
Lasanske compels rejection of Gerondale claim
State v. Anthony R. Giebel, 2013AP1874-CR, District 2, 4/9/14; c0urt of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Giebel challenged his misdemeanor repeater sentence based on the holding in State v. Gerondale, Nos. 2009AP1237/1238-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Nov. 3, 2009). While his appeal was pending, the court of appeals decided State v. Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26,
Counting out-of-state “zero tolerance” OWI violations as prior offenses doesn’t violate Equal Protection Clause
State v. Daniel M. Hirsch, 2014 WI App 39; case activity
The equal protection clause isn’t violated by § 343.307(1)(d)‘s differing treatment of Wisconsin and out-of-state” zero tolerance” OWI offenses (which penalize drivers under the legal drinking age who drive with any alcohol concentration).
Hirsch had two prior driver’s license suspensions for violation Illinois’s zero tolerance law. Under § 343.307(1)(d),
Good-bye to Gerondale: Enhanced misdemeanor sentences are governed by the basic 75% and 25% rules
State v. Lee Thomas Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26; case activity
In a decision that may finally settle the issue of how to bifurcate enhanced misdemeanor sentences, the court of appeals holds that § 973.01(2)(c)1.’s prohibition against using an enhancer to increase a period of extended supervision does not apply to enhanced misdemeanor sentences. Instead, enhanced misdemeanor sentences are subject to the basic rules that the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence may not exceed 75% of the total sentence,
Once again, court of appeals holds enhancer time may be used for extended supervision portion of an enhanced misdemeanor sentence
State v. Torrey L. Smith-Iwer, 2013AP1426-CR, District 1, 12/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Smith-Iwer was convicted of four misdemeanors as a repeat offender under § 939.62(1)(a) and given four consecutive two-year sentences, each consisting of one year of confinement and one year of extended supervision. He moved for postconviction relief, arguing the sentences were illegal under State v. Volk,
Use of counsel in prior cases defeats defendant’s claim that he didn’t knowingly waive his right to counsel in later case
State v. Scott J. Stelzer, 2013AP1555-CR, District 2, 12/27/13 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication), case activity
After being convicted of his 3rd OWI offense, Stelzer moved to exclude his 2nd OWI (which occurred in 1996) from the calculation of his prior convictions on the grounds that he was not represented by counsel when he pled guilty to it. Nor did he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at that time.
Another unpublished decision holds enhancer time may be used for the extended supervision portion of an enhanced misdemeanor sentence
State v. Emmit L. Groce, Jr., 2013AP844-CR, District 1, 9/4/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Groce was convicted of criminal damage to property as a repeat offender under § 939.62(1)(a) and given a bifurcated sentence consisting of one year of confinement in prison and one year of extended supervision. (¶¶2-3). He later requested a sentence modification under State v. Gerondale,
OWI — collateral attack on prior conviction; awareness of minimum penalty
State v. Jaime M. Salomon, 2013AP577-CR, District 2, 8/21/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Salomon collaterally attacked his second OWI conviction under State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92, arguing his waiver of counsel in the case was invalid because he was not aware of the minimum mandatory penalty for the offense. The transcript of the plea hearing in the prior case shows Salomon admitted to having read the complaint,
Yet another take on how to structure bifurcated sentences for an enhanced misdemeanor
State v. Gabriel Griffin, 2012AP2631-CR, District 1, 7/30/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Agreeing with State v. Gerondale, 2009AP1237-CR and 2009AP1238-CR (Wis. Ct. App Nov. 3, 2009) (unpublished), and State v. Ash, No. 2012AP381-CR (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2012) (unpublished), that there is a conflict in § 973.01 which affects the structure of enhanced misdemeanor sentences,