On Point: 3. Particular statutes

State v. Kent Kleven, 2005 WI App 66
For Kleven: Roberta A. Heckes

Issue/Holding: Where sentencing includes multiple enhancers, the court may identify the amount of confinement attributable to each enhancer, without violating the rule that an enhancer doesn’t support a separate sentence. ¶¶16-18. (The court adds, however, ¶18 n. 4, that the “better practice” is to avoid “allocating any portions of the confinement imposed among the base offense and enhancers.”)

Issue/Holding: Maximum confinement for TIS-I attempt to commit a classified felony is one-half the maximum confinement for the completed crime,

State v. Michael D. Jackson, 2004 WI 29, affirming unpublished decision of court of appeals
For Jackson: Joseph E. Schubert

Issue: Whether penalty enhancement of a TIS-I sentence, § 973.01(2) (1997-98), applies to the confinement portion alone, or to the total term of imprisonment (including extended supervision), of a bifurcated sentence.

Holding:

¶17. The key to understanding the applicability of penalty enhancers under TIS-I lies in Wis.

State v. Michael D. Jackson, 2004 WI 29, affirming unpublished decision of court of appeals
For Jackson: Joseph E. Schubert

Issue/Holding:

¶42 Applying the rule of lenity, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 should be read together with Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c) in calculation of the maximum term of confinement for unclassified felonies with penalty enhancers under TIS-I. We apply the 75% rule of Wis.

State v. Michael D. Lewis, 2004 WI App 211
For Lewis: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding: Sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, as persistent repeater due to prior conviction for sexual assault of a child, on a current conviction for child enticement isn’t cruel / unusual punishment under the 8th amendment. ¶¶16-18.

State v. Brandon L. Mason, 2004 WI App 176
For Dawson: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: The felony murder statute, § 940.03 (1999-2000), contains characteristics suggestive of both penalty enhancers (it adds a specified term to the maximum penalty applicable to the underlying crime), ¶15, and also substantive offenses (it is located in a chapter that defines substantive offenses; and it incorporates the elements of offenses located elsewhere),

State v. Richard W. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, affirming unpublished decision
For Delaney: Joseph R. Cincotta

Issue/Holding:

¶1 … Specifically, Delaney asks this court to determine whether Wis. Stat. § 939.62 (1999-2000) was properly applied to his already enhanced OWI offense under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(c), based on the existence of a past non-OWI offense, so as to enhance Delaney’s penalty twice for count one of his judgment of conviction.

State v. Donald R. Wield, 2003 WI App 179, PFR filed 8/28/03
For Wield: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The persistent repeater law, § 939.62(2m) is constitutional; State v. Radke, 2003 WI 7, 259 Wis. 2d 13, 657 N.W.2d 66, controls. ¶¶20-21.

State v. Alan R. Radke, 2003 WI 7, affirming 2002 WI App 146
For Radke: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶5. The precise question raised, therefore, is whether the “two strikes” law violates the Due Process Clause of either the United States or Wisconsin Constitution because it requires a greater penalty to be imposed on an offender convicted of a second Class B non-fatal child sexual assault than the statutes require to be imposed on an offender convicted of a second Class A felony homicide offense.

State v. Donald R. Wield, 2003 WI App 179, PFR filed 8/28/03
For Wield: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: In determining whether a prior conviction under a since-repealed statute is a serious child sex offense comparable to § 948.02(1) so as to invoke the persistent repeater law, the “elements only” test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) doesn’t apply: “Thus,

State v. Paul R. Maxey, 2003 WI App 94
For Maxey: Douglas I. Henderson

Issue/Holding: A sentence may be enhanced by both the general repeater provision of § 939.62(1)(b) (1999-2000) and § the specific repeat drug offender provision of § 961.48(2) (1999-2000), given the rationale of State v. Richard W. Delaney, 2003 WI 9:

¶14. In summary, the law of Wis.