On Point: 3. Particular statutes

State v. Leonard J. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, affirming 2007 WI App 29
For Quintana: James B. Connell, Robyn J. DeVos, William R. Kerner

Issue/Holding:

¶81      We conclude that the school zone penalty enhancer is not unconstitutional as applied to Quintana. The legislature has sought to increase the penalty for those who commit violent crimes within 1,000 feet of “school premises.”

State v. Ronnie L. Thums, 2006 WI App 173
For Thums: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether an offense which was partially committed during the TIS-I regime but not completed until advent of TIS-II comes under the former or latter sentencing regime.

Holding:

¶11      Thums had not committed the crime of stalking with a dangerous weapon during TIS-I. He therefore did not become subject to the TIS-I penalties during TIS-I.

State v. Kent Kleven, 2005 WI App 66
For Kleven: Roberta A. Heckes

Issue/Holding: Where sentencing includes multiple enhancers, the court may identify the amount of confinement attributable to each enhancer, without violating the rule that an enhancer doesn’t support a separate sentence. ¶¶16-18. (The court adds, however, ¶18 n. 4, that the “better practice” is to avoid “allocating any portions of the confinement imposed among the base offense and enhancers.”)

Issue/Holding: Maximum confinement for TIS-I attempt to commit a classified felony is one-half the maximum confinement for the completed crime,

State v. Michael D. Jackson, 2004 WI 29, affirming unpublished decision of court of appeals
For Jackson: Joseph E. Schubert

Issue: Whether penalty enhancement of a TIS-I sentence, § 973.01(2) (1997-98), applies to the confinement portion alone, or to the total term of imprisonment (including extended supervision), of a bifurcated sentence.

Holding:

¶17. The key to understanding the applicability of penalty enhancers under TIS-I lies in Wis.

State v. Michael D. Jackson, 2004 WI 29, affirming unpublished decision of court of appeals
For Jackson: Joseph E. Schubert

Issue/Holding:

¶42 Applying the rule of lenity, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6 should be read together with Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c) in calculation of the maximum term of confinement for unclassified felonies with penalty enhancers under TIS-I. We apply the 75% rule of Wis.

State v. Michael D. Lewis, 2004 WI App 211
For Lewis: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding: Sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, as persistent repeater due to prior conviction for sexual assault of a child, on a current conviction for child enticement isn’t cruel / unusual punishment under the 8th amendment. ¶¶16-18.

State v. Brandon L. Mason, 2004 WI App 176
For Dawson: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: The felony murder statute, § 940.03 (1999-2000), contains characteristics suggestive of both penalty enhancers (it adds a specified term to the maximum penalty applicable to the underlying crime), ¶15, and also substantive offenses (it is located in a chapter that defines substantive offenses; and it incorporates the elements of offenses located elsewhere),

State v. Richard W. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, affirming unpublished decision
For Delaney: Joseph R. Cincotta

Issue/Holding:

¶1 … Specifically, Delaney asks this court to determine whether Wis. Stat. § 939.62 (1999-2000) was properly applied to his already enhanced OWI offense under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(c), based on the existence of a past non-OWI offense, so as to enhance Delaney’s penalty twice for count one of his judgment of conviction.

State v. Donald R. Wield, 2003 WI App 179, PFR filed 8/28/03
For Wield: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The persistent repeater law, § 939.62(2m) is constitutional; State v. Radke, 2003 WI 7, 259 Wis. 2d 13, 657 N.W.2d 66, controls. ¶¶20-21.

State v. Alan R. Radke, 2003 WI 7, affirming 2002 WI App 146
For Radke: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶5. The precise question raised, therefore, is whether the “two strikes” law violates the Due Process Clause of either the United States or Wisconsin Constitution because it requires a greater penalty to be imposed on an offender convicted of a second Class B non-fatal child sexual assault than the statutes require to be imposed on an offender convicted of a second Class A felony homicide offense.