On Point: E. Enhancers

State v. James A. Krahn, 2012AP1898-CR, District 2, 1/30/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Motion to dismiss second-offense OWI charge was properly denied, where the charge resulted from the state’s successful motion to reopen a conviction for a first offense that had been entered a few weeks after a conviction in another case that was also treated as a first offense:

¶6        Wisconsin trial courts have no subject-matter jurisdiction over second or subsequent drunk driving offenses tried as first offenses contrary to Wis.

State v. Scott B. Bohlinger, 2013 WI App 39; case activity

Bohlinger made a prima facie showing that two prior OWI convictions were invalid because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel due to his limited cognitive capabilities. The circuit court concluded he had not made such a showing because he did not allege any deficiency in the colloquies addressing the waiver of counsel in the earlier cases.

State v. Juan G. Gracia, 2013 WI 15; affirming unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Warrantless Entry – “community caretaker” exception

Entry into Gracia’s bedroom by police, who had linked him to a serious traffic accident, was justified by the community caretaker doctrine because the police had an objectively reasonable basis to believe Gracia needed assistance, distinguishing State v.

State v. Verhagen, State v. Nickles,  State v. Van Asten, and State v. Bell, 2013 WI App 16; consolidated court of appeals decision; case activity: Verhagen; Nickles; Van Asten; and Bell

OWI – Use of first offense to enhance penalty

In a prosecution for a second or subsequent OWI offense, New Jersey v. Apprendi,

State v. Joseph L. Hernandez, 2012AP2148-CR, District 2, 2/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court properly found that Hernandez made a prima facie showing that a prior OWI conviction was invalid despite his poor recollection of details of the prior proceeding, distinguishing State v. Hammill, 2006 WI App 128, ¶11, 293 Wis. 654, 718 N.W.2d 747 (“a defendant who ‘simply does not remember what occurred at his plea hearing’ does not make a prima facie showing”):

¶10      Although this case somewhat resembles Hammill in that it involves a defendant’s less than perfect memory of the earlier proceedings and a sparse record,

Question Presented:

Whether this Court’s decision in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), should be overruled.

Docket

Lower court opinion (U.S. v. Alleyne, CTA4 No. 11-4208, 12/15/11 (unpublished))

Scotusblog page

Alleyne was convicted by a jury of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a robbery,

State v. Lisa M. Arentz, 2011AP2307-CR / State v. Eric R. Hendricks, 2012AP243-CR, District 2, 9/5/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity (Arentz; Hendricks)

Criminal OWI prosecution is premised on, and a resulting sentence enhanced by, a prior civil-forfeiture OWI conviction (which does not itself require unanimous jury verdict upon proof beyond reasonable doubt). Arentz and Hendricks raise the same arguments: the elements of the underlying civil forfeiture must be proved to the jury beyond reasonable at the criminal trial;

Question Presented:

The California Burglary Statute Section 459 does not require as an element that a burglar “enter or remain unlawfully in a building”. The Ninth Circuit held that it could determine whether this “missing element” was shown to have been proven by applying the modified categorical approach.

The issues presented are as follows:

1- Whether the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in United States v.

State v. Lavon J. Ash, Sr., 2012AP381-CR, District 2, 8/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Ash was sentenced to concurrent terms of one-year initial confinement, one-year extended supervision on two misdemeanor counts, a sentence structure he successfully challenges. Incompatible statutory mandates lie at the heart of the problem. In the first instance, § 973.01(1)  requires bifurcated misdemeanor sentences, which simply isn’t possible for unenhanced misdemeanors: a bifurcated sentence must be served in prison,

State v. Roshawn Smith, 2012 WI 91, reversing in part, affirming in part unpublished decision; case activity

Standard of Review: Sufficiency of Evidence 

¶29  We understand Smith’s central argument regarding the standard of review on the evidentiary question to be summed up in the proposition that a jury verdict of guilt[9] must be reversed on appeal if “[t]he inferences that may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence are as consistent with innocence as with guilt.”