On Point: E. Enhancers

State v. Rogelio Guarnero, 2015 WI 72, 7/9/15, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority by Roggensack; dissent by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)

In a decision that is short on analysis and long on Sixth Amendment problems, the supreme court holds that Guarnero’s prior conviction for conspiring to violate the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act was a conviction for a crime “under a statute … relating to controlled substances,” and therefore qualified as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender enhancement provision of § 961.41(3g)(c), because the factual basis for the conviction involved controlled substance offenses.

Johnson v. United States, USSC No. 13-7120, 2015 WL 2473450 (June 26, 2015), reversing and remanding United States v. Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. 708 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A six-Justice majority of the Supreme Court holds that “the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause [of the Armed Career Criminal Act] both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges” because the case law has failed to establish a generally applicable test that prevents application of the clause from devolving into “guesswork and intuition.” (Slip op. at 5, 8). Therefore, using the residual clause to increase a defendant’s sentence denies the defendant due process of law.

State v. Andre M. Chamblis, 2015 WI 53, 6/12/15, reversing an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals; opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court unanimously holds that when the parties in an OWI prosecution are disputing the number of prior offenses, the circuit court can require the dispute to be resolved before it accepts the defendant’s plea; it doesn’t have to wait till sentencing to determine the number of prior offenses. And even if the court errs in denying the state the chance to prove an additional prior OWI conviction at sentencing, it violates due process to allow the circuit court to resentence the defendant on the basis of the additional conviction if the additional conviction would increase the penalty that could be imposed.

Question presented:

Whether the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2)—which requires a prison term of at least ten years if a defendant convicted of possessing child pornography “has a prior conviction … under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward”—is triggered by a prior conviction under a state law relating to “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse,” even though the conviction did not “involv[e] a minor or ward.”

State v. Sherwood A. Lebo, 2014AP730-CR, District 3, 4/7/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lebo failed to make a prima facie showing that his right to counsel was violated in two prior OWI proceedings because he didn’t point to specific facts demonstrating that he did not know or understand information that should have been provided during the waiver of counsel colloquy, as required by State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, ¶¶25-26, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92.

Question presented:

Whether Florida’s death sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment in light of this Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by SCOW). See order granting review.

1.  Where a defendant seeks to plead guilty or no contest to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), or with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), do State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) and due process principles require that the number of prior offenses that count for sentence enhancement be determined prior to entry of the defendant’s plea?

2.  Is a court of appeals’ decision ordering remand to the circuit court with instructions to: (1) issue an amended judgment of conviction reflecting a conviction for operating with a PAC, as a seventh offense, and (2) hold a resentencing hearing, and impose a sentence consistent with the penalty ranges for a seventh offense, constitutionally impermissible under Bangert and due process principles where the defendant specifically entered a plea of guilty to PAC as a sixth offense, where the circuit court sentenced the defendant in accordance to proper penalties for PAC as a sixth offense, and where the defendant has already served the confinement portion of such sentence?

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity: 2013AP1753-CR; 2013AP1754-CR

Issue (composed by On Point)

Does Guarnero’s conviction for violating the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act qualify as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender enhancement provision of § 961.41(3g)(c) because the RICO conviction’s predicate acts involved, among other things, controlled substance offenses, thus making the RICO conviction a conviction for a crime “under a statute … relating to controlled substances”?

City of Kaukauna v. Grant R. Loescher, 2014AP954, District 3, 11/4/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Loescher’s 1997 conviction for first-offense OWI is not void because it was properly counted as a first offense despite his OWI conviction in 1992.

State v. Andre Durand Reggs, 2013AP2367-CR, District 4, 7/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Applying State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92, the circuit court properly concluded that Reggs failed to make a prima facie showing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel for an earlier OWI conviction.