On Point blog, page 8 of 19
Bifurcated sentences for enhanced misdemeanors reversed because they violate the 75% rule
State v. Eric T. Alston, 2013AP1833-CR & 2013AP1834-CR, District 4, 4/19/16 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1833-CR; 2013AP1834-CR
Bifurcated sentences that were first modified under the now-superseded, unpublished ruling in State v. Gerondale have to be modified again because they violate the rule that the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence can’t exceed 75% of the total sentence.
Court of appeals clarifies Harris rule that court must impose maximum sentence before applying repeater penalty ehancer
State v. Adam W. Miller, 2013AP2218; 6/5/14; District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity
The court of appeals holds that a circuit court may apply the § 939.62(1)(c) penalty enhancer to increase Miller’s term of initial confinement beyond the maximum prescribed by law without first imposing the maximum term of imprisonment, as in the maximums for both initial confinement and extended supervision.
Police didn’t violate Fifth or Sixth Amendment in taking statement of defendant cited for forfeiture offense
State v. Thaddeus M. Lietz, 2013AP1283-CR, District 3, 5/20/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Leitz’s statements to police were not obtained in violation of either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment, so the circuit court properly denied his suppression motion.
Federal racketeering conviction counts as prior drug offense under § 961.41(3g)(c)
State v. Rogelio Guarnero, 2014 WI App 56, petition for review granted 11/14/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 72; case activity: 2013AP1753-CR; 2013AP1754-CR
Guarnero’s conviction for violating the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act was a conviction for a crime “under a statute … relating to controlled substances,” and therefore qualified as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender enhancement provision of § 961.41(3g)(c), because the predicate acts of racketeering involved, among other things, controlled substance offenses.
State proved defendant made valid waiver of right to counsel in prior OWI case
State v. Casey D. Schwandt, 2013AP2775-CR, District 2, 4/23/14 (one judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Schwandt’s knowledge about both the role attorneys play and their specialized training showed he made a valid waiver of counsel in a prior OWI case, despite his claim he was unaware of what an attorney could do for him in the particular case in which he waived counsel.
Samuel James Johnson v. United States, USSC No. 13-7120, cert. granted 4/21/14
Whether mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun should be treated as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act?
Statutory summary suspension from Illinois counts as prior conviction under § 343.307(1)
State v. Akil C. Jackson, 2014 WI App 50; case activity
Under State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132, 330 Wis. 2d 1, 794 N.W.2d 213, Jackson’s statutory summary suspension in Illinois resulting from an OWI and PAC citation counts as a prior conviction under § 343.307(1) even though the citation was eventually dismissed.
Carter considered whether a prior suspension of operating privileges under the Illinois “zero tolerance” law should be counted as a prior conviction under § 343.307.
Lasanske compels rejection of Gerondale claim
State v. Anthony R. Giebel, 2013AP1874-CR, District 2, 4/9/14; c0urt of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Giebel challenged his misdemeanor repeater sentence based on the holding in State v. Gerondale, Nos. 2009AP1237/1238-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Nov. 3, 2009). While his appeal was pending, the court of appeals decided State v. Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26,
Counting out-of-state “zero tolerance” OWI violations as prior offenses doesn’t violate Equal Protection Clause
State v. Daniel M. Hirsch, 2014 WI App 39; case activity
The equal protection clause isn’t violated by § 343.307(1)(d)‘s differing treatment of Wisconsin and out-of-state” zero tolerance” OWI offenses (which penalize drivers under the legal drinking age who drive with any alcohol concentration).
Hirsch had two prior driver’s license suspensions for violation Illinois’s zero tolerance law. Under § 343.307(1)(d),
Good-bye to Gerondale: Enhanced misdemeanor sentences are governed by the basic 75% and 25% rules
State v. Lee Thomas Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26; case activity
In a decision that may finally settle the issue of how to bifurcate enhanced misdemeanor sentences, the court of appeals holds that § 973.01(2)(c)1.’s prohibition against using an enhancer to increase a period of extended supervision does not apply to enhanced misdemeanor sentences. Instead, enhanced misdemeanor sentences are subject to the basic rules that the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence may not exceed 75% of the total sentence,