On Point: E. Enhancers

Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by SCOW). See order granting review.

1.  Where a defendant seeks to plead guilty or no contest to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), or with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), do State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) and due process principles require that the number of prior offenses that count for sentence enhancement be determined prior to entry of the defendant’s plea?

2.  Is a court of appeals’ decision ordering remand to the circuit court with instructions to: (1) issue an amended judgment of conviction reflecting a conviction for operating with a PAC, as a seventh offense, and (2) hold a resentencing hearing, and impose a sentence consistent with the penalty ranges for a seventh offense, constitutionally impermissible under Bangert and due process principles where the defendant specifically entered a plea of guilty to PAC as a sixth offense, where the circuit court sentenced the defendant in accordance to proper penalties for PAC as a sixth offense, and where the defendant has already served the confinement portion of such sentence?

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity: 2013AP1753-CR; 2013AP1754-CR

Issue (composed by On Point)

Does Guarnero’s conviction for violating the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act qualify as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender enhancement provision of § 961.41(3g)(c) because the RICO conviction’s predicate acts involved, among other things, controlled substance offenses, thus making the RICO conviction a conviction for a crime “under a statute … relating to controlled substances”?

City of Kaukauna v. Grant R. Loescher, 2014AP954, District 3, 11/4/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Loescher’s 1997 conviction for first-offense OWI is not void because it was properly counted as a first offense despite his OWI conviction in 1992.

State v. Andre Durand Reggs, 2013AP2367-CR, District 4, 7/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Applying State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92, the circuit court properly concluded that Reggs failed to make a prima facie showing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel for an earlier OWI conviction.

State v. Eric T. Alston, 2013AP1833-CR & 2013AP1834-CR, District 4, 4/19/16 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1833-CR; 2013AP1834-CR

Bifurcated sentences that were first modified under the now-superseded, unpublished ruling in State v. Gerondale have to be modified again because they violate the rule that the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence can’t exceed 75% of the total sentence.

State v. Adam W. Miller, 2013AP2218; 6/5/14; District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The court of appeals holds that a circuit court may apply the § 939.62(1)(c) penalty enhancer to increase Miller’s term of initial confinement beyond the maximum prescribed by law without first imposing the maximum term of imprisonment, as in the maximums for both initial confinement and extended supervision.

State v. Thaddeus M. Lietz, 2013AP1283-CR, District 3, 5/20/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Leitz’s statements to police were not obtained in violation of either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment, so the circuit court properly denied his suppression motion.

State v. Rogelio Guarnero, 2014 WI App 56, petition for review granted 11/14/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 72; case activity: 2013AP1753-CR; 2013AP1754-CR

Guarnero’s conviction for violating the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act was a conviction for a crime “under a statute … relating to controlled substances,” and therefore qualified as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender enhancement provision of § 961.41(3g)(c), because the predicate acts of racketeering involved, among other things, controlled substance offenses.

State v. Casey D. Schwandt, 2013AP2775-CR, District 2, 4/23/14 (one judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Schwandt’s knowledge about both the role attorneys play and their specialized training showed he made a valid waiver of counsel in a prior OWI case, despite his claim he was unaware of what an attorney could do for him in the particular case in which he waived counsel.

Question presented:

Whether mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun should be treated as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act?