On Point: 5. Proof

Erlinger v. United States, USSC No. 23-370, June 21, 2024, vacating United States v. Erlinger, 77 F.4th 617 (7th Cir. 2023); Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)

Whether offenses committed on three “occasions different from one another” for purposes of federal Armed Career Criminal Act must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Alfonso C. Loayza, 2021 WI 11, 2/11/21, reversing a per curiam decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court unanimously holds that the state proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Loayza was convicted of OWI in California in 1990, making his current Wisconsin offense a eighth offense.

State v. Justin A. Braunschweig, 2018 WI 113, 12/21/18, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Braunschweig was convicted in 2011 of causing injury by intoxicated operation of a vehicle. The conviction was expunged under § 973.015. In 2016 he was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol content, both as a second offense because of the 2011 conviction. The supreme court rejects his claim that the expunged conviction can’t be a predicate offense under § 343.307(1).

State v. Kory v. Ambroziak, 2017AP22-CR, 9/19/17, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Ambroziak argued that he was incorrectly sentenced for a 2nd-offense OWI because the State had failed to prove the existence of a prior OWI-related offense beyond a reasonable doubt. But the court of appeals held that the State carried its burden. Thus, the circuit court correctly sentenced Ambroziak with second-offense OWI penalties.

The Supreme Court of Ohio recently answered that question “no.” State v. Hand, 2016 Ohio 5504, 2016 WL 4486068, 8/25/16. Hand rejects the majority position on this question, and instead adopts the position of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001), holding that the lack of a jury trial in juvenile proceedings under Ohio law means a juvenile adjudication isn’t a “prior conviction” that, under Appendi v.  New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), can be used to enhance a sentence without having the jury determine the existence of the prior conviction.

Charles Walker v. Kathy Griffin, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2147, 2016 WL 4501988, 8/29/16

Walker’s lawyer on his direct state appeal decided to challenge the reasonableness of Walker’s sentence, but he didn’t raise an issue about the sufficiency of the evidence to support applying an habitual offender enhancer to Walker. That failure didn’t constitute ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

State v. Gavin S. Hill, 2016 WI App 29; case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals holds that the standards for alleging and applying the ordinary repeater enhancer under § 939.62 also govern the domestic abuse repeater enhancer under § 939.621. Thus, the state must either prove that the defendant was convicted of the required predicate offenses or the defendant must admit that he was convicted of those offenses.

Question presented:

Whether a predicate prior conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act must qualify as such under the elements of the offense simpliciter, without extending the modified categorical approach to separate statutory definitional provisions that merely establish the means by which referenced elements may be satisfied rather than stating alternative elements or versions of the offense.

State v. Joseph C. Risse, 2015AP586, District 3, 1/12/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Risse pled to an OWI, but was it his first or second? The state, armed with a Wisconsin Certified Driving Record, says he had a 2008 chemical test refusal in Connecticut. Risse, bearing a collection of documents from Connecticut and elsewhere, submits that they prevent the state from showing the prior beyond a reasonable doubt.