On Point blog, page 1 of 2
SCOTUS requires jury to find whether prior offenses occurred on different occasions to enhance sentence under Armed Career Criminal Act
Erlinger v. United States, USSC No. 23-370, June 21, 2024, vacating United States v. Erlinger, 77 F.4th 617 (7th Cir. 2023); Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
Whether offenses committed on three “occasions different from one another” for purposes of federal Armed Career Criminal Act must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Bill Tyroler on using prior juvenile delinquency adjudications as sentence enhancers
Everyone once in awhile–sometimes around Groundhog Day–our former colleague emerges to post some entertaining comments about a significant development in the law. These remarks about a SCOTUSblog “petition of the day” filed in Ohio v. Hand, now pending, were cut and pasted from Bill’s Facebook page.
Can juvenile adjudications be used to enhance criminal sentences without proving the conduct to a jury?
The Supreme Court of Ohio recently answered that question “no.” State v. Hand, 2016 Ohio 5504, 2016 WL 4486068, 8/25/16. Hand rejects the majority position on this question, and instead adopts the position of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001), holding that the lack of a jury trial in juvenile proceedings under Ohio law means a juvenile adjudication isn’t a “prior conviction” that, under Appendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), can be used to enhance a sentence without having the jury determine the existence of the prior conviction.
Appellate counsel not ineffective for failing to challenge habitual offender status
Charles Walker v. Kathy Griffin, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2147, 2016 WL 4501988, 8/29/16
Walker’s lawyer on his direct state appeal decided to challenge the reasonableness of Walker’s sentence, but he didn’t raise an issue about the sufficiency of the evidence to support applying an habitual offender enhancer to Walker. That failure didn’t constitute ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
SCOTUS: Jury, not judge, must decide whether to impose death penalty
Hurst v. Florida, USSC No. 14-7505, 2016 WL 112683 (January 12, 2016); reversing and remanding Hurst v. State, 147 So.3d 435 (Fla. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
In Florida the jury makes a recommendation as to whether to impose the death penalty, but the judge then holds a separate sentencing hearing and decides whether there are sufficient aggravating circumstances to justify the death penalty. This sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.” (Slip op. at 1).
Failure to require jury to decide whether conduct qualified for sentence enhancer was error and prejudiced defendant
State v. Lonel L. Johnson, Jr., 2014AP2888-CR, District 3, 9/15/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity
High fives for the defense! The domestic abuse repeater enhancer applied to this defendant increased his maximum penalty for the charged offense. Thus, the court of appeals held (and the State conceded) that the jury had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his underlying conduct qualified as an act of domestic abuse. That’s what Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) requires, but it didn’t happen here. The real win, however, is that for once the State did NOT prevail on its claim of harmless error!!
SCOW: Federal RICO conviction “relates to” controlled substances for purposes of the repeat drug offender enhancer
State v. Rogelio Guarnero, 2015 WI 72, 7/9/15, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority by Roggensack; dissent by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)
In a decision that is short on analysis and long on Sixth Amendment problems, the supreme court holds that Guarnero’s prior conviction for conspiring to violate the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act was a conviction for a crime “under a statute … relating to controlled substances,” and therefore qualified as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender enhancement provision of § 961.41(3g)(c), because the factual basis for the conviction involved controlled substance offenses.
Hurst v. Florida, USSC No. 14-7505, cert. granted 3/9/15
Whether Florida’s death sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment in light of this Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
U.S. Supreme Court holds that a fact that increases the minimum mandatory sentence for a crime must be submitted to the jury
Allen Ryan Alleyne v. United States, USSC No. 11-9335, 6/17/13
United States Supreme Court decision, vacating and remanding United States v. Alleyne, No. 11-4208 (4th Cir. Dec. 15, 2011)
Since Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), a defendant has had the right to demand the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that increases the maximum sentence for a crime.
Use of 1st OWI offense to enhance penalty; collateral attack on prior OWI
State v. Verhagen, State v. Nickles, State v. Van Asten, and State v. Bell, 2013 WI App 16; consolidated court of appeals decision; case activity: Verhagen; Nickles; Van Asten; and Bell
OWI – Use of first offense to enhance penalty
In a prosecution for a second or subsequent OWI offense, New Jersey v. Apprendi,