On Point: I. Expungement

State v. Sean B. Day, 2021AP1018, 11/24/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including brief)

Day was initially charged with repeated sexual assault of a child for sexual contact with a 14-year-old when he was 17. He ended up pleading to a single count of fourth-degree sexual assault and was put on probation. The circuit court failed to mention expunction at the sentencing hearing, but later–both in writing and at the postconviction motion hearing–it gave the reasons it did not find expunction appropriate.

State v. Larry A. Brown, 2021AP12-CR, District 1, 6/29/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Brown was charged with theft by embezzlement and accepted a deferred prosecution agreement for the charge. He subsequently picked up new charges of THC possession and carryng a concealed weapon, for which he was given probation. That of course led to revocation of the DPA and sentencing on the theft. Brown asked for expunction of the theft conviction, which the circuit court denied. It properly exercised its discretion in doing so.

State v. Jordan Alexander Lickes, 2021 WI 60, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2019AP1272-CR, 6/15/21, case activity (including briefs)

In State v. Ozuna, SCOW held that a young offender’s violation of any court-imposed conditions of probation renders expungement unavailable. Here, Lickes argued that: (1) the same rule does not apply to conditions imposed by the DOC, and (2) the circuit court has the discretion to find that an offender has satisfied the DOC’s conditions even if he has violated one or more of them and especially when, as in this case, the DOC itself requests expungement. In a split decision, SCOW rejects both arguments, making expungement a pipe dream for most young offenders.

State v. Keandrae J. Reed, 2020AP1921-CR, District 1, 6/2/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After being convicted of misdemeanor theft, Reed was placed on probation and given the chance for expungement. While he successfully discharged from probation, he isn’t entitled to expungement because he didn’t do enough to pay restitution to have “successfully completed” his sentence as required by § 973.015(1m)(b).

State v. Jordan Alexander Lickes, review of a published court of appeals decision granted 11/18/20; case activity (including briefs)

Issues presented (from the PfR):

Does the expungement statute’s requirement that a probationer have “satisfied the conditions of probation” also mean that the probationer must perfectly comply at all times with each and every rule of probation set by the probation agent?

When a circuit court chooses to hold a hearing and exercise discretion to determine whether a probationer who violated a rule set by his agent has nevertheless “satisfied the conditions of probation” so as to qualify for expungement, should the appellate court review the circuit court’s decision for an erroneous exercise of discretion?

When a circuit court makes factual findings concerning whether a probationer violated a condition of probation rendering him ineligible for expungement, must the appellate court uphold the finding in the absence of clear error?

State v. Justin A. Braunschweig, 2018 WI 113, 12/21/18, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Braunschweig was convicted in 2011 of causing injury by intoxicated operation of a vehicle. The conviction was expunged under § 973.015. In 2016 he was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol content, both as a second offense because of the 2011 conviction. The supreme court rejects his claim that the expunged conviction can’t be a predicate offense under § 343.307(1).

State v. Kole R. Eichinger, 2017AP1845-1847-CR, 10/16/18, District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This case highlights an expunction issue that SCOW still needs to resolve. Prior to 2014, circuit courts often delayed deciding expunction until they saw how a defendant did on probation. State v. Matasek, 2014 27, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811 changed that practice.  It clarified that courts must decide whether to order expunction at the time of sentencing.  What about all of the defendants who were expressly told at sentencing that they could apply for expunction after they completed probation?

State v. Justin A. Braunschweig, 2017AP1261-CR, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals decision granted 6/11/18; case activity (including briefs)

Braunschweig was convicted of first-offense OWI causing injury, but that conviction was expunged. So, when he picked up another OWI, was it a first or a second?

State v. Cheneye Leshia Edwards, 2017AP633-CR, 4/17/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity (including briefs).

Edwards entered a plea to disorderly conduct and asked the sentencing court to order expungement in the event he successfully completed probation.  The court denied the request without explaining why. So Edwards filed a postconviction motion arguing that (1) the sentencing court erroneously exercised its discretion, and (2) the postconviction court had the inherent authority to grant expunction.  The court of appeals reversed on (1) and declined to address (2).

State v. Justin A. Braunschweig, 2017AP1261-CR, 2/1/8, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); petition for review granted 6/11/18, affirmed, 2018 WI 113;  case activity (including briefs)

Let’s hope expunction has not worn out its welcome at SCOW because this decision could use review and possibly reversal. The State charged Braunschweig (no “er”) with OWI and PAC 2nd and submitted a certified DOT record to prove that he was convicted of an OWI 1st in 2011–a conviction that had been expunged. On appeal he argues that an expunged conviction cannot serve as a predicate for an OWI 2nd. It should be considered a status element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals disagrees, and the upshot is that someone charged with OWI cannot claim the primary benefit conferred by §973.015–i.e. a fresh start. Is that what the Wisconsin legislature intended?