On Point: 1. Mandatory minimum

State v. Clayton W. Williams, 2014 WI 64, 7/15/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

This opinion addresses § 346.65(2)(am)6. as it applied to OWI 7th, 8th, and 9th offenses committed between July 1, 2010, when the statute first took effect, and April 10, 2014, when it was amended by 2014 Wis. Act 224. During that time period, the statute provided that the offense was a Class G felony, and that “[t]he confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed on the person under [§] 973.01 shall be not less than 3 years.” The supreme court concludes this language is ambiguous because it could be read either to require a court to impose a bifurcated sentence or, instead, to permit a court to order probation with or without imposition of a bifurcated sentence, but that the legislative history makes it clear the language requires courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with a mandatory minimum three-year period of initial confinement.

Review of published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Does § 346.65(2)(am)6., which provides that “the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed under s. 973.01 [for an OWI 7th, 8th, or 9th] shall be not less than 3 years,” require that a bifurcated sentence be imposed?

The court of appeals held that the statute requires a minimum period of confinement if a bifurcated sentence is imposed,

Allen Ryan Alleyne v. United States, USSC No. 11-9335, 6/17/13

United States Supreme Court decision, vacating and remanding United States v. Alleyne, No. 11-4208 (4th Cir. Dec. 15, 2011)

Since Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), a defendant has had the right to demand the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that increases the maximum sentence for a crime.

State v. Clayton W. Williams, 2013 WI App 74, petition for review granted 11/21/13; reversed, 2014 WI 64, 7/15/14; case activity

Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. makes OWI 7th, 8th, or 9th a Class G felony, but also provides that “[t]he confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed on the person under s. 973.01 shall be not less than 3 years.”

State v. Tony J. Lalicata, 2012 WI App 138 (recommended for publication); case activity

Probation is not an available disposition under § 948.02(1)(b) (child sexual assault). By mandating that “the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence” with a confinement portion of at least 25 years for that offense, § 939.616 forecloses the possibility of probation:

¶14      …  We conclude instead that § 939.616(1r) unambiguously prohibits probation,

State v. Carlos G. Comas, 2010AP2687-CR, District 4, 9/29/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Comas: Steven D. Grunder, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Although Comas was charged with § 948.025(1)(a), repeated sexual assault of the same child by acts of sexual intercourse, the case was in effect tried under § 948.025(1)(ar) ,which requires acts of sexual intercourse or contact. Comas received a confinement term of 25 years,

State v. Tommie L. Cole, 2003 WI 59, on certification
For Cole: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶9. The court of appeals asks that we determine what combination of confinement in prison and extended supervision constitutes the presumptive minimum sentence when a statute provides that an offender “shall be imprisoned for not less than 3 years.”10 In other words,

State v. William P. Eckola, 2001 WI App 295
For Eckola: Gregory A. Parker

Issue: Whether the trial court erroneously exercised discretion by placing Eckola on probation for OWI-6th without requiring confinement for at least the presumptive minimum mandated by § 346.65(2)(e).

Holding:

¶15. When the circuit court, in its discretion, determines that a defendant will be placed on probation, Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(d) requires that the person be confined for at least the mandatory minimum period.