On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Kyle Lee Monahan, 2014AP2187, 4/27/17, District 4 (not recommended for publication) review granted 11/13/17; Affirmed 6/29/18; case activity (including briefs)

Kyle Monahan was convicted of OWI homicide after a jury trial. The trial court excluded evidence offered to show that Monahan was not, in fact, driving the vehicle when it crashed. On appeal, the state agrees with Monahan that the evidence should have come in, but argues that its exclusion was harmless. The court of appeals agrees with the state.

State v. J.J.S., 2016AP1519, 4/25/17, District 3 (1-judge appeal; ineligible for publication); case activity

The case appears to be an issue of first impression: Whether §938.34(5)(c), which provides that juveniles under 14 can’t be required to pay more than $250 in restitution, refers to the juvenile’s age when the State filed the delinquency petition or the juvenile’s age at the time of disposition. The court of appeals, choosing the time of disposition, upholds the $1,600 restitution award against J.J.S., even though he was just 13 when the filed its petition.

Nelson v. Colorado, USSC No. 15-526, (April 20, 2017), reversing and remanding Colorado v. Nelson, 364 P.3d 866 (2015); SCOTUSblog page (inlcuding links to briefs and commentary).

This decision establishes that a State cannot force an exonerated defendant to file a civil suit and prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence in order to recover costs, fees, and restitution he paid upon conviction.

This week Wired ran an op-ed arguing that courts should stop using algorithms to set bail and sentence defendants until some ground rules are set. Yes, it discusses Compas and State v. Loomis. But beyond that it describes what could happen if courts move from using simple algorithms to using deep learning algorithms known as neural networks to sentence someone. Here is an excerpt from the article:

Consider a scenario in which the defense attorney calls a developer of a neural-network-based risk assessment tool to the witness stand to challenge the “high risk” score that could affect her client’s sentence.

State v. Thomas G. St. Peter, 2016AP683-CR, District 1, 4/18/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

St. Peter is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the judge violated his due process rights when it relied on inaccurate information to jump the parties’ joint recommendation for time served and impose more jail time. State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1 (sentencing based on inaccurate information violates due process). Not only that, but the judge erroneously exercised his sentencing discretion by failing to link the relevant facts and factors of the case to the standard sentencing objectives. —And you thought an erroneous exercise of sentencing discretion was as mythical a beast as a unicorn!

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Whether a defendant may, by voluntary absence or other conduct, waive the statutory right to be present at trial before the trial has begun?

Cle A. Gray, Jr. v. Robert Humphries, 2016AP584-CR, 4/6/17, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including state’s brief)

Gray sought to prevent the Department of Corrections from taking certain money from his prison accounts to pay the costs and restitution Gray had been ordered to pay, but the court of appeals holds DOC’s collection actions were valid under the judgment of conviction and relevant statutes.

State v. David L. Johnson, 2015AP2605-CR, 4/4/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A jury found Johnson guilty of aggravated battery and false imprisonment but acquitted him of sexual assault and strangulation. The court imposed 2 consecutive 6-year sentences.  Johnson appealed and argued that the postconviction court erred in denying his claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel without a hearing, imposing a DNA surcharge in violation of the ex post facto clause, and in denying resentencing. 

State v. Peter J. Long, 2016AP729, 3/28/17, District 1 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity (including state’s brief)

Peter Long filed a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 arguing that his sentence for OWI-4th should be commuted or modified to the maximum sentence for an OWI-3rd, because one of his priors was uncounseled.

State v. Matthew A. Seward, 2016AP1248-CR, 3/22/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This is a permissive appeal. Matthew Seward is charged with OWI-3rd; he seeks reversal of the circuit court’s denial of his collateral attack on his OWI-2nd conviction.