On Point blog, page 28 of 96
Bill Tyroler on using prior juvenile delinquency adjudications as sentence enhancers
Everyone once in awhile–sometimes around Groundhog Day–our former colleague emerges to post some entertaining comments about a significant development in the law. These remarks about a SCOTUSblog “petition of the day” filed in Ohio v. Hand, now pending, were cut and pasted from Bill’s Facebook page.
Bias in criminal risk scores is mathematically inevitable, researchers say
There is new research to support a racial bias challenge to COMPAS. You may recall that last spring Pro Publica studied COMPAS scores for some 10,000 people arrested for crimes in Broward County, Florida and published its results. It found that black defendants were twice as likely to be incorrectly labeled as higher risk to reoffend than white defendants. And white defendants labeled low risk were far more likely to end up being charged with new offenses than blacks with comparably low COMPAS risk scores.
Expungement decision requires proper exercise of discretion, including statement of rationale
State v. Rachel M. Helmbrecht, 2017 WI App 5; case activity (including briefs)
A circuit court’s decision on whether to order expungement under § 973.015 involves the exercise of discretion, and therefore the general rules governing the proper exercise of discretion apply to the expungement decision.
No abuse of discretion in sentence or sex offender registration
State v. David H. Ninnemann, 2016AP1294-CR, 12/14/2016, District 2 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
David Ninnemann appeals from sentencing after revocation of his probation. He challenges the length of his jail sentences and the court’s order that he register as a sex offender, but the court of appeals upholds both of the trial court’s discretionary decisions.
Due process doesn’t forbid DNA surcharge where no sample taken
State v. Travis J. Manteuffel, 2016AP96-CR, 12/6/16, District 3 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
State v. Elward, 2015 WI App 51, 363 Wis. 2d 628, 866 N.W.2d 756, held it an ex post facto violation to require misdemeanants to pay the $200 DNA surcharge where the law imposing it went into effect after they had committed their crimes.
Over-the-road trucker’s cab counts as “residence” for purposes of domestic abuse modifiers
State v. Michael Lee Brayson, 2016AP896-CR, District 1, 11/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Brayson’s girlfriend, L.A.R., is a long-haul trucker. When she goes out on the road he accompanies her and stays with her in the truck, though both maintained separate addresses in Mississippi. (¶¶3-6). Under these facts, Brayson’s convictions for battery of L.A.R. at a Wisconsin travel center were subject to the domestic abuse surcharges and modifiers under §§ 968.075(1)(a)(intro.) and 973.055(1)(a)2. because Brayson and L.A.R. “reside[d]” together in the truck.
Court of appeals asks SCOW to review whether circuit court must advise of DNA surcharges at plea hearing
State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR; District 2, 11/9/16; certification refused 1/9/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Does the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitute “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent?
Michael O’Hear on public attitudes toward sentencing
Professors O’Hear and Wheelock surveyed over 800 registered voters in Wisconsin about their attitudes toward punishment, rehabilitation and reform. See how public attitudes toward sentencing vary by race, gender and political party affiliation here.
Prison sentences your client won’t live to complete
Here’s an interesting new study on the consequences of courts imposing prison sentences that are much longer than a person’s natural lifespan.
Packingham v. North Carolina, USSC No. 15-1194, cert. granted 10/28/16
Question presented (as formulated by Scotusblog):
Whether, under the court’s First Amendment precedents, a law that makes it a felony for any person on the state’s registry of former sex offenders to “access” a wide array of websites – including Facebook, YouTube, and nytimes.com – that enable communication, expression, and the exchange of information among their users, if the site is “know[n]” to allow minors to have accounts, is permissible, both on its face and as applied to petitioner, who was convicted based on a Facebook post in which he celebrated dismissal of a traffic ticket, declaring “God is Good!”