On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Mendell Stokes, 2015AP1335-CR, District 2, 11/4/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Applying State v. Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d 135, 556 N.W.2d 728 (1996), the court of appeals holds the record provided “competent proof” that Stokes was operating after revocation for a prior OWI offense and, thus, was subject to criminal penalties instead of a civil forfeiture, § 343.44(1)(b) and (2)(ar)2.

State v. Tabitha A. Scruggs, 2015 WI App 88, petition for review granted, 3/7/16, affirmed, 2017 WI 15; case activity (including briefs)

Addressing a question left open by State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, the court of appeals holds that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws does not bar the mandatory imposition of a DNA surcharge for a single felony conviction based on conduct that was committed before the mandatory DNA surcharge requirement took effect.

State v. Courtney E. Sobonya, 2015 WI App 86; case activity (including briefs)

Sobonya launched a creative challenge to the denial of her §973.015 request for expungement.  The court had held that while she would benefit from expungement, society would be harmed by the reduced deterrent effect of her sentence.  So Sobonya moved for sentence modification based on an expert report showing that the public safety is best served by removing the barriers that convicted offenders face when trying to reintegrate into society.

If you are working on a COMPAS issue, you may be interested in a new research paper, “Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing,” from the University of Virginia School of Law.  Here is the abstract:

State v. Eric L. Loomis, 2015AP157-CR, District 4, 9/17/15, certification granted 11/4/15, circuit court affirmed, 2016 WI 68; case activity (including briefs)

Issues

We certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide whether the right to due process prohibits circuit courts from relying on COMPAS assessments when imposing sentence. More specifically, we certify whether this practice violates a defendant’s right to due process, either because the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents defendants from challenging the COMPAS assessment’s scientific validity, or because COMPAS assessments take gender into account. Given the widespread use of COMPAS assessments, we believe that prompt supreme court review of the matter is needed.

State v. Lonel L. Johnson, Jr., 2014AP2888-CR, District 3, 9/15/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity

High fives for the defense! The domestic abuse repeater enhancer applied to this defendant increased his maximum penalty for the charged offense. Thus, the court of appeals held (and the State conceded) that the jury had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his underlying conduct qualified as an act of domestic abuse. That’s what Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) requires, but it didn’t happen here.  The real win, however, is that for once the State did NOT prevail on its claim of harmless error!!

State v. Eriberto Valadez, 2014AP2855-CR, District 1, 9/1/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Under State v. Goetz, 2001 WI App 294, 249 Wis. 2d 380, 638 N.W.2d 386, Valadez wasn’t in custody for Miranda purposes during the execution of a search warrant of his home, so the police questioning of him during that time didn’t have to be preceded by Miranda warnings.

State v. Bradley Wayne Phillips, 2014AP2519-CR, District 1, 9/1/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Phillips challenges his conviction for failing to pay child support because:  (1) the trial court prohibited testimony from an expert witness about whether Phillips was employable; (2) the postconviction court did not find Phillips’s defense counsel ineffective for allegedly failing to present a plea offer from the State; (3) the postconviction court denied Phillips a Machner hearing on his multiple other allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) the postconviction court denied Phillips’ motion for resentencing.  The court of appeals rejects all of Phillips’s claims. 

State v. Sharod D. Weaver, 2015AP170-CR, District 3, 8/31/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Though the sentencing court made comments suggesting it mistakenly believed the OWI sentencing guidelines “don’t consider the four primary sentencing factors,” these comments don’t show the sentencing court actually believed that; rather, the court of appeals concludes, the sentencing court was saying that following the guidelines was not appropriate in Weaver’s case. Thus, the sentencing court didn’t misuse its discretion.

State ex rel. Christopher W. Baade v. Brian Hayes, 2015 WI App 71; case activity (including briefs)

Section 973.155(4) says that sentence credit granted to inmates serving sentences of one year or less in a county jail or a house of correction “shall include earned good time….” That language doesn’t apply to inmates who are placed on probation and given conditional jail time with good time because probation condition time isn’t a sentence.