On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. John Eddie Farmer, Sr., 2014AP2623-CR, 6/30/15, District 1 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs

Defense lawyers encounter this problem too often. The circuit court inadequately explains the reasons for the sentence it imposed and then shores up its rationale at the postconviction stage. This decision holds that a circuit court, which failed to mention any sentencing objectives, nevertheless met Gallion’s “bare minimum requirements.” And even if it hadn’t, it wouldn’t matter because the court of appeals could search the record for reasons to affirm the sentence. Slip op. ¶14.

State v. Greenwood, 2014AP2219-CR,6 /30/15, District 3 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs

Greenwood, who was convicted of several misdemeanors, sought resentencing on the grounds that the circuit court had relied on inaccurate information at the initial sentencing. Specifically, Greenwood alleged that the court believed his sentences would be served in  jail when, in fact, § 973.03(2) required that he serve his sentences in prison. The court  of appeals rejected this claim.

Glossip v. Gross, USSC No. 14-7955, 2015 WL 2473454 (June 29, 2015), affirming Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In a 5-to-4 vote, the Supreme Court rejects the claims of Oklahoma death-row prisoners that the use of a particular drug (midazolam) in the three-drug lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment because it creates an unacceptable risk of severe pain. In addition to deep disagreements about the applicable Eighth Amendment standard and the lower court’s fact-finding, the case is notable for the sparring between two concurring justices (Scalia and Thomas) and a dissenting justice (Breyer, joined by Ginsburg), who now believes “it highly likely that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment” and that the Court should ask for full briefing on that basic question. (Breyer dissent at 1, 2).

Johnson v. United States, USSC No. 13-7120, 2015 WL 2473450 (June 26, 2015), reversing and remanding United States v. Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. 708 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A six-Justice majority of the Supreme Court holds that “the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause [of the Armed Career Criminal Act] both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges” because the case law has failed to establish a generally applicable test that prevents application of the clause from devolving into “guesswork and intuition.” (Slip op. at 5, 8). Therefore, using the residual clause to increase a defendant’s sentence denies the defendant due process of law.

State v. Andre M. Chamblis, 2015 WI 53, 6/12/15, reversing an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals; opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court unanimously holds that when the parties in an OWI prosecution are disputing the number of prior offenses, the circuit court can require the dispute to be resolved before it accepts the defendant’s plea; it doesn’t have to wait till sentencing to determine the number of prior offenses. And even if the court errs in denying the state the chance to prove an additional prior OWI conviction at sentencing, it violates due process to allow the circuit court to resentence the defendant on the basis of the additional conviction if the additional conviction would increase the penalty that could be imposed.

Question presented:

Whether the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2)—which requires a prison term of at least ten years if a defendant convicted of possessing child pornography “has a prior conviction … under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward”—is triggered by a prior conviction under a state law relating to “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse,” even though the conviction did not “involv[e] a minor or ward.”

State v. Gregory Mark Radaj, 2015 WI App 50; case activity (including briefs)

A defendant who committed a felony before the effective date of the law mandating a $250 DNA surcharge for each felony conviction, but who is sentenced after that effective date, cannot be made to pay the surcharge on each felony conviction because that violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Instead, the defendant may only be subject to a single discretionary surcharge of $250.

State v. Garett T. Elward, 2015 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)

Defendants who committed a misdemeanor offense before April 1, 2015 January 1, 2014, cannot be made to pay the mandatory $200 DNA surcharge that is supposed to be imposed for each misdemeanor conviction beginning January 1, 2014, because imposition of the surcharge on that class of defendants violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. [See UPDATE below regarding the date change.]

State v. Chaz L. Brown, 2014AP1848-CR, District 3, 5/19/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A “midsummer night’s attempt at self-help debt collection” (¶2) led to Brown being charged with disorderly conduct and battery. He was acquitted of the battery charges based on his self-defense claim, but he was convicted of the DC. (¶¶2-5). Based on Brown’s conduct during the entire incident, there was sufficient evidence showing a causal connection between Brown’s DC and the battery victim’s damages to support the trial court’s restitution order.

State v. Sherwood A. Lebo, 2014AP730-CR, District 3, 4/7/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lebo failed to make a prima facie showing that his right to counsel was violated in two prior OWI proceedings because he didn’t point to specific facts demonstrating that he did not know or understand information that should have been provided during the waiver of counsel colloquy, as required by State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, ¶¶25-26, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92.