On Point: 36. Sentencing

Question presented:

Whether the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2)—which requires a prison term of at least ten years if a defendant convicted of possessing child pornography “has a prior conviction … under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward”—is triggered by a prior conviction under a state law relating to “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse,” even though the conviction did not “involv[e] a minor or ward.”

State v. Gregory Mark Radaj, 2015 WI App 50; case activity (including briefs)

A defendant who committed a felony before the effective date of the law mandating a $250 DNA surcharge for each felony conviction, but who is sentenced after that effective date, cannot be made to pay the surcharge on each felony conviction because that violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Instead, the defendant may only be subject to a single discretionary surcharge of $250.

State v. Garett T. Elward, 2015 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)

Defendants who committed a misdemeanor offense before April 1, 2015 January 1, 2014, cannot be made to pay the mandatory $200 DNA surcharge that is supposed to be imposed for each misdemeanor conviction beginning January 1, 2014, because imposition of the surcharge on that class of defendants violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. [See UPDATE below regarding the date change.]

State v. Chaz L. Brown, 2014AP1848-CR, District 3, 5/19/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A “midsummer night’s attempt at self-help debt collection” (¶2) led to Brown being charged with disorderly conduct and battery. He was acquitted of the battery charges based on his self-defense claim, but he was convicted of the DC. (¶¶2-5). Based on Brown’s conduct during the entire incident, there was sufficient evidence showing a causal connection between Brown’s DC and the battery victim’s damages to support the trial court’s restitution order.

State v. Sherwood A. Lebo, 2014AP730-CR, District 3, 4/7/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lebo failed to make a prima facie showing that his right to counsel was violated in two prior OWI proceedings because he didn’t point to specific facts demonstrating that he did not know or understand information that should have been provided during the waiver of counsel colloquy, as required by State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, ¶¶25-26, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92.

Questions presented:

Whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital-sentencing jury be affirmatively instructed that mitigating circumstances “need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,” as the Kansas Supreme Court held here, or instead whether the Eighth Amendment is satisfied by instructions that, in context, make clear that each juror must individually assess and weigh any mitigating circumstances

Whether the trial court’s decision not to sever the sentencing phase of the co-defendant brothers’ trial here—a decision that comports with the traditional approach preferring joinder in circumstances like this—violated an Eighth Amendment right to an “individualized sentencing” determination and was not harmless in any event.

Questions Presented:

1) Did the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), adopt a new substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review to people sentenced as juveniles to life in prison without parole?

2) Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to decide whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly refused to give retroactive effect to Miller?

Question presented:

Whether Florida’s death sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment in light of this Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

State v. Richard J. Nelson, 2014AP1794-CR, District 3, 2/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

While the victim’s injuries could have been caused by the alleged conduct for which Nelson was acquitted, they could also have been the result of the conduct for which Nelson was convicted. Thus, there was a basis for finding a causal connection between Nelson’s conduct and the injuries and the circuit court properly ordered restitution.

State v. Johnny E. Miller, 2014AP1392-CR, 2/18/05, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity Miller argued that the State breached its plea agreement with him when, at sentencing, it recommended that he be eligible for the Earned Release Program only after he served a specified period of prison time. The State, he claimed, […]