On Point: 36. Sentencing

Questions presented:

Whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital-sentencing jury be affirmatively instructed that mitigating circumstances “need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,” as the Kansas Supreme Court held here, or instead whether the Eighth Amendment is satisfied by instructions that, in context, make clear that each juror must individually assess and weigh any mitigating circumstances

Whether the trial court’s decision not to sever the sentencing phase of the co-defendant brothers’ trial here—a decision that comports with the traditional approach preferring joinder in circumstances like this—violated an Eighth Amendment right to an “individualized sentencing” determination and was not harmless in any event.

Questions Presented:

1) Did the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), adopt a new substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review to people sentenced as juveniles to life in prison without parole?

2) Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to decide whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly refused to give retroactive effect to Miller?

Question presented:

Whether Florida’s death sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment in light of this Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

State v. Richard J. Nelson, 2014AP1794-CR, District 3, 2/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

While the victim’s injuries could have been caused by the alleged conduct for which Nelson was acquitted, they could also have been the result of the conduct for which Nelson was convicted. Thus, there was a basis for finding a causal connection between Nelson’s conduct and the injuries and the circuit court properly ordered restitution.

State v. Johnny E. Miller, 2014AP1392-CR, 2/18/05, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Miller argued that the State breached its plea agreement with him when, at sentencing, it recommended that he be eligible for the Earned Release Program only after he served a specified period of prison time. The State, he claimed, impermissibly advocated a harsher sentence than recommended. The court of appeals rejected Miller’s argument because he and the State simply “did not have any agreement as to ERP eligibility.”

State v. Travis Deon Williams, 2014AP2064-CR, 2014AP2065-CR, 2014AP2066-CR, and 2014AP2067-CR, District 1, 2/10/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The prosecutor presented inaccurate information at Williams’s sentencing, but Williams hasn’t proven the circuit court relied on the information.

State v. Danny Robert Alexander, 2015 WI 6, 1/27/15), reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack; case activity

Alexander claimed he is entitled to resentencing because his sentence was based in part on compelled statements he made to his supervision agent. The supreme court rejects his claim after concluding that the circuit court did not rely on the compelled statements in imposing sentence.

State v. Jose O. Gonzalez-Villarreal, 2013AP1615-CR, District 1, 1/27/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The court of appeals rejects Gonzalez-Villarreal’s challenge to his conviction for possessing child pornography based on claims that: his right to a speedy trial was violated; discovery restrictions violated his right to equal protection; other acts evidence was erroneously admitted; the trial court rejected his modified jury instruction on possession; the court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion.

State v. Charles A. McIntyre, 2014AP800-CR, District 3, 12/30/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

When pronouncing sentence in McIntyre’s case the circuit court repeatedly interchanged “consecutive” and “concurrent” when referring to Count One (of five). (¶¶2-5). Thus, despite the court’s several attempts at clarification during the sentencing hearing, the sentence imposed on that count was ambiguous because it was “undeniably confusing and capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two different ways.” (¶11). Nonetheless, the court’s intent was clear, so it properly amended the judgment post-sentencing to clarify that Count One was consecutive.

State v. Lance F., 2014AP1881-FT, 12/23/14, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

A circuit court lacks authority to order a juvenile (who had been found delinquent for battery, disorderly conduct and physical abuse of a child) to make restitution of the victim’s missing property, where he was never charged with theft of the property, he never admitted to stealing the property, and the state did not read in charges relating to theft of the property. The court explained: