On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Timothy D. Russell, 2014AP451-CR, District 1, 12/23/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

When sentencing Russell for a series of thefts committed while he was deputy chief of staff to the Milwaukee County Executive, the circuit court referred to the charge to which Russell pled as “misconduct in public office, … not a theft as I think has been reported.” (¶8). The court of appeals holds that the sentencing transcript, when read as a whole, makes it clear that the circuit court did not erroneously believe it was sentencing Russell for the offense of misconduct in public office, but merely intended to note that Russell committed the offense of theft by virtue of his public position as deputy chief of staff to the Milwaukee County Executive.

State v. Kearney W. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, 12/18/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

At last, a unanimous SCOW decision settles how §973.015 is really supposed to work. Upon a young person’s successful completion of a sentence or probation, the detaining or probationary authority must issue a certificate of discharge to the court. This alerts the clerk to expunge the record. No petition is necessary. And once a court grants expungement, and the young person performs as required, the court cannot reverse its decision.

State v. Tahj E. Kitt, 2015 WI App 9; case activity

“When a convicted offender has put sentence credit at issue, the court—not the clerk—must make and explain the decision on how much sentence credit is to be awarded.” (¶2).

State v. Jordan John Samsa, 2015 WI App 6; case activity

The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in using the criminogenic needs section of the COMPAS assessment report, which identifies areas in which the offender needs correctional or community intervention, as an indicator of Samsa’s danger to the community.

Questions presented:

1) Does the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), apply retroactively to this case?

2) Is a federal question raised by a claim that a state collateral review court erroneously failed to find that a new constitutional rule fits within an exception to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which held that new constitutional rules are generally not applied retroactively to cases on collateral review?

State v. Andrew R. Geurts, 2014AP1520-CR, District 4, 12/4/14 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court had no authority to expunge the record of Geurts’s criminal case after it was dismissed after his successful completion of a deferred prosecution agreement because § 973.015 applies only to the record of an offense for which the person has been found guilty.

Kenosha County v. Blaire A. Frett, 2014 WI App 127; case activity

State v. Melody P.M., 2009 AP2991 (WI App June 10, 2009), a 1-judge opinion, held that Wis. Stat. § 973.015 permits circuit courts to expunge civil forfeiture violations. Here, the court of appeals explicitly overrules  Melody P.M. and holds that civil forfeiture violations may not be expunged.

Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by SCOW). See order granting review.

1.  Where a defendant seeks to plead guilty or no contest to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), or with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), do State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) and due process principles require that the number of prior offenses that count for sentence enhancement be determined prior to entry of the defendant’s plea?

2.  Is a court of appeals’ decision ordering remand to the circuit court with instructions to: (1) issue an amended judgment of conviction reflecting a conviction for operating with a PAC, as a seventh offense, and (2) hold a resentencing hearing, and impose a sentence consistent with the penalty ranges for a seventh offense, constitutionally impermissible under Bangert and due process principles where the defendant specifically entered a plea of guilty to PAC as a sixth offense, where the circuit court sentenced the defendant in accordance to proper penalties for PAC as a sixth offense, and where the defendant has already served the confinement portion of such sentence?

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity: 2013AP1753-CR; 2013AP1754-CR

Issue (composed by On Point)

Does Guarnero’s conviction for violating the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act qualify as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender enhancement provision of § 961.41(3g)(c) because the RICO conviction’s predicate acts involved, among other things, controlled substance offenses, thus making the RICO conviction a conviction for a crime “under a statute … relating to controlled substances”?

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

When additional sentence credit is granted after an offender’s parole has been revoked, is the additional credit applied to the offender’s term of reincarceration, or to the remaining period of parole?