On Point blog, page 40 of 95
State v. Jesse Herrmann, 2013AP197-CR, petition for review granted 9/24/14
On review of a per curiam unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity
Issue (composed by On Point)
Did the circuit court violate Jesse Herrmann’s due process right to an impartial judge by exhibiting objective bias in sentencing Herrmann?
Defendant allowed dual credit for presentence custody served for a burglary and an unrelated civil commitment
State v. Joseph T. Trepanier, 2014 WI App 105; case activity
This case presents an issue of first impression: Whether a defendant is entitled to sentence credit for time spent in presentence custody for a burglary when he was also in custody pursuant to an unrelated civil commitment for contempt of court. The State, naturally, opposed dual sentence credit. But the winner is . . . the defendant!
Lengthy imposed and stayed sentence wasn’t unduly harsh or excessive
State v. Britton D. McKenzie, 2014AP314-CR, District 4, 8/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Consecutive jail sentences totaling 24 months were not unduly harsh and excessive.
SCOW: “Take me to my cell” or “I don’t want to talk about this” won’t end interrogations
State v. Carlos Cummings and State v. Adrean L. Smith, 2014 WI 88, 7/24/14, affirming per curiam court of appeals decisions in 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR, majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; concurrence/dissent by Justice Prosser (joined by Justice Bradley); dissent by Chief Justice Abrahamson; case activity for Cummings and Smith
These cases address whether two Mirandized suspects unequivocally invoked their respective rights to remain silent, or cut off questioning, during police interrogations. Citing State v. Markwardt, 2007 WI App 242 the majority held that both defendants seem to have meant something other than what they literally said. Their attempts to cut off questioning were “equivocal” and thus their statements need not be suppressed.
Was the pronouncement of sentence ambiguous? Or was the sentence illegal?
State v. Craig C. Meier, 2013AP2863-CR, District 4, 7/17/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The answer matters: If the pronouncement of sentence is ambiguous the court could “clarify[] and “reimpose[]” the sentences it originally intended, Krueger v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 435, 442-43, 272 N.W.2d 847 (1979); if the sentence is illegal, it must be commuted to the lawful maximum, § 973.13. In this case the court of appeals holds the circuit court’s initial pronouncement of sentences in this case was ambiguous, so it affirms the circuit court’s “correction” of the sentences to reflect the sentences the court intended to impose.
SCOW: Penalty provisions covering OWI 7th and above require imposition of a bifurcated sentence
State v. Clayton W. Williams, 2014 WI 64, 7/15/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity
This opinion addresses § 346.65(2)(am)6. as it applied to OWI 7th, 8th, and 9th offenses committed between July 1, 2010, when the statute first took effect, and April 10, 2014, when it was amended by 2014 Wis. Act 224. During that time period, the statute provided that the offense was a Class G felony, and that “[t]he confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed on the person under [§] 973.01 shall be not less than 3 years.” The supreme court concludes this language is ambiguous because it could be read either to require a court to impose a bifurcated sentence or, instead, to permit a court to order probation with or without imposition of a bifurcated sentence, but that the legislative history makes it clear the language requires courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with a mandatory minimum three-year period of initial confinement.
Collateral attack on prior OWI failed to make prima facie showing
State v. Andre Durand Reggs, 2013AP2367-CR, District 4, 7/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Applying State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92, the circuit court properly concluded that Reggs failed to make a prima facie showing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel for an earlier OWI conviction.
Failure to present evidence of alternative sources for child’s sexual knowledge wasn’t ineffective
State v. Bryanntton A. Brown, 2013AP1332-CR, District 1, 6/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present certain evidence that the complainant in Brown’s child sexual assault prosecution may have obtained her sexual knowledge from watching TV and movies and talking to her older sister. Nor was trial counsel ineffective for not taking steps to mitigate the impact of a letter Brown purportedly wrote to Carson, a fellow jail inmate, in which Brown admitted the charges. Finally, the circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.
Bifurcated sentences for enhanced misdemeanors reversed because they violate the 75% rule
State v. Eric T. Alston, 2013AP1833-CR & 2013AP1834-CR, District 4, 4/19/16 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1833-CR; 2013AP1834-CR
Bifurcated sentences that were first modified under the now-superseded, unpublished ruling in State v. Gerondale have to be modified again because they violate the rule that the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence can’t exceed 75% of the total sentence.
State v. Kearney Hemp, 2013AP1163, petition for review granted 6/12/14
On review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity
Issues (composed by On Point)
When, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.015, a sentencing court orders the expunction of a defendant’s record upon successful completion of his sentence, does expunction occur automatically upon the circuit court clerk’s receipt of the defendant’s certificate of discharge or must the defendant file a petition for expunction?
If the defendant must petition the circuit court for expunction, then: (a) is there a deadline by which he must file it, and (b) who is required to forward the certificate of discharge to the circuit court—the defendant or the Department of Corrections (or other detaining authority)?
If a defendant successfully completes his sentence or probation, thereby earning expunction, may the circuit court revoke the grant of expunction based upon the defendant’s post-discharge conduct?