On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Wayne P. Harris, 2012 wI App 79(recommended for publication); for Harris:  Attorney Gary Grass; case activity

We know that “[a] defendant has a due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information.”  See State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶9, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1  But what happens when the sentencing court relies upon a DOC-prepared revocation summary that is “technically true but misleading” or that is “written in a way that that invite[s] the court to draw negative inferences”? 

State v. Eric Archie Armstrong, District 2/1, 2010AP1056-CR, 5/30/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Armstrong: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Setting restitution four years after sentencing didn’t violate double jeopardy principles, turning principally on whether Johnson “had a legitimate expectation of finality in the first judgment,” State v. Greene, 2008 WI App 100, ¶15, 313 Wis.

on review of unpublished court of appeals decision; for Gracia: Tracey A. Wood; case activity

Warrantless Entry – Community Caretaker / OWI Enhancer – Collateral Attack 

Issues (Composed by On Point): 

Whether the community caretaker doctrine supported entry into Gracia’s bedroom after the police linked him to a serious traffic accident.

Whether Gracia’s waiver of counsel in a prior OWI conviction used as a penalty enhancer was valid,

State v. Matthew O. Roach, 2011AP2105-CR, District 4, 5/17/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Roach: Brandon Kuhl; case activity

Mootness Doctrine – Generally 

¶8 n. 2:

The State also contends that this issue is moot because the condition of probation Roach challenges expired on January 19, 2012.  An issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying controversy.  

State v. Dwain M. Staten, 2011AP916-CR, District 1, 5/8/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Staten: Michael J. Steinle; case activity

Postconviction DNA Testing, § 974.07 

Postconviction testing at state expense requires, among other things, that the defendant show a reasonable probability he wouldn’t have been prosecuted or convicted with exculpatory test results. Staten, whose defense to sexual assault was consent rather than misidentification,

State v. Thaying Lor, 2011AP2019-CR, District 1, 5/1/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Lor: Benjamin F. Gallagher; case activity

Effective Assistance of Counsel 

Counsel did not provide ineffective representation in the following respects:

• Failure to timely file motion seeking admission of complainant’s prior untruthful allegation of sexual assault. However, Lor did not provide, including in his postconviction motion,

State v. David D. Austin, 2011AP1042, District 1, 4/10/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; case activity

Because Austin was no longer in custody under the conviction he sought to collaterally attack pursuant to § 974.06, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain his motion. It is not enough that he was in custody under some sentence, rather than the particular conviction he sought to attack:

¶12      Austin submits that the wording of Wis.

Monroe Ace Setser v. U.S., USSC No. 10-7387, 3/28/12, affirming 607 F.3d 128 (5th Cir 2010)

District courts have authority to make a sentence for a federal offense consecutive to an anticipated, but not-yet imposed state sentence. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. §3584, construed.

It is fundamental that we construe statutes governing the jurisdiction of the federal courts in light of “the common-law background against which the statutes .

State v. Scott P. Wojcik, 2011AP2568-CR, District 2, 3/21/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Wojcik: Christopher Lee Wiesmueller; case activity

90-day jail sentence for OWI-2nd (minimum 0f 5 days, maximum of 6 months) upheld as proper exercise of discretion. Trial court considered as aggravators recentness of prior OWI conviction (2008) and his seeming level of impairment (stumbled on getting out of car); and stressed deterrent purpose of sentence.

State v. Traci L. Scott, 2011AP2115-CR, District 2, 3/21/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Scott: Rex Anderegg; case activity

The court rejects Scott’s challenge to a prior OWI conviction, concluding that she aware of the range of punishments, dangers of self-representation, etc. General test recited:

¶2        A defendant facing an enhanced sentence based on a prior conviction may only collaterally attack that prior conviction based on the denial of the constitutional right to counsel.