On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Alvin C. Harris, 2012AP518-CR, District 2, 9/12/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Plea-Withdrawal 

Harris failed to make a prima facie showing that his plea colloquy was defective, therefore his motion to withdraw plea was properly denied without an evidentiary hearing:

¶7        Here, Harris’s motion alleged that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because of a defect in the plea colloquy.  

State v. Lisa M. Arentz, 2011AP2307-CR / State v. Eric R. Hendricks, 2012AP243-CR, District 2, 9/5/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity (Arentz; Hendricks)

Criminal OWI prosecution is premised on, and a resulting sentence enhanced by, a prior civil-forfeiture OWI conviction (which does not itself require unanimous jury verdict upon proof beyond reasonable doubt). Arentz and Hendricks raise the same arguments: the elements of the underlying civil forfeiture must be proved to the jury beyond reasonable at the criminal trial;

Question Presented:

The California Burglary Statute Section 459 does not require as an element that a burglar “enter or remain unlawfully in a building”. The Ninth Circuit held that it could determine whether this “missing element” was shown to have been proven by applying the modified categorical approach.

The issues presented are as follows:

1- Whether the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in United States v.

State v. Lavon J. Ash, Sr., 2012AP381-CR, District 2, 8/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Ash was sentenced to concurrent terms of one-year initial confinement, one-year extended supervision on two misdemeanor counts, a sentence structure he successfully challenges. Incompatible statutory mandates lie at the heart of the problem. In the first instance, § 973.01(1)  requires bifurcated misdemeanor sentences, which simply isn’t possible for unenhanced misdemeanors: a bifurcated sentence must be served in prison,

State v. Johnnie Austin, 2011AP2953-CR, District 1, 8/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Continued detention of Austin, following an indisputably proper stop for illegal parking, was supported by reasonable suspicion:

¶14      This court disagrees; the trial court properly found Officer Tisher’s continued detention of Austin reasonable.  If, during a valid traffic stop, an officer becomes reasonably suspicious of an individual,

State v. Mark M. Benson, 2012 WI App 101 (recommended for publication); case activity

Equal Protection – Homicide of Unborn Child by Intoxicated Use of Motor Vehicle, §§ 939.75(2)(b)3, 940.09(1)(c) 

Section § 939.75(2)(b)3 exempts from criminal liability any “act by a woman who is pregnant with an unborn child that results in the death of or great bodily harm, substantial bodily harm or bodily harm to that unborn child.”

State v. Cody A. Gibson, 2012 WI App 103 (recommended for publication); case activity

Restitution order to reimburse insurance company and owner for insurance deductible, in relation to losses arising from stolen auto, upheld. The company (Acuity) paid the owners $11,113 the same day the car was stolen, but the car was recovered with very little damage the very next day. The car was appraised at $10,379 and Acuity turned it over to a salvage company,

State v. Brandon M. Melton, 2012 WI App 95, WSC review granted 11/14/12(recommended for publication), supreme court review granted 11/14/12; case activity

Under “unique facts,” the circuit court possessed inherent authority to order destruction of a PSI: the PSI contained uncharged offenses irrelevant to sentencing whose inclusion was improper under DOC rules; and, though sealed, it coexisted with a second PSI in the court file:

¶22      The circuit court did not articulate any public policy reasons for rejecting Melton’s request to destroy the entire PSI report,

State v. Michael L. Frey, 2012 WI 99, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Sentencing Discretion – Reliance on Dismissed Charge 

The sentencing court may consider charges “dismissed” or “dismissed outright” (as opposed to read-ins)

¶47  To discharge its obligation to discern a defendant’s character, “[a] sentencing court may consider uncharged and unproven offenses,” State v. Leitner,

State v. Roshawn Smith, 2012 WI 91, reversing in part, affirming in part unpublished decision; case activity

Standard of Review: Sufficiency of Evidence 

¶29  We understand Smith’s central argument regarding the standard of review on the evidentiary question to be summed up in the proposition that a jury verdict of guilt[9] must be reversed on appeal if “[t]he inferences that may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence are as consistent with innocence as with guilt.”