On Point blog, page 60 of 96
DNA Surcharge – Timeliness of Challenge
State v. Raymond Allen Nickel, 2010 WI App 161 (recommended for publication); pro se; State Resp.; Robert R. Henak, WACDL, Amicus Brief
Nickel’s challenge to his DNA surcharge was untimely, because made outside the direct appeal time limits:
¶5 When a defendant moves to vacate a DNA surcharge, the defendant seeks sentence modification. Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 973.19, a defendant may move for sentence modification within ninety days after sentencing.
Sentencing – Right to be Sentenced by Judge Who Took Plea / Heard Evidence of Guilt
State v. Kacey G. Johnson, 2010AP1263-CR, District 1, 11/23/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Johnson: James B. Duquette; Johnson BiC; State Resp.; Reply
Johnson forfeited his claim of a right to be sentenced by the judge who took his guilty plea, by failing to object contemporaneously. This is not a matter requiring the defendant’s personal assent.
¶11 Fundamental fairness is a general due process concept.
State v. Charles Lamar, 2009 WI App 133, review granted 10/27/10
Prior post: here; background summary by court: here
Issue (from Table of Cases):
Whether, at resentencing, a defendant would be entitled to credit on a new sentence for time spent confined on a vacated sentence, which was served concurrently with another non-vacated sentence, when the new sentence is imposed consecutively to all other sentences (See Wis. Stat. § 973.04).
Guilty Plea – Withdrawal – Presentence, Undisclosed Exculpatory Evidence, Waiver Rule; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel; Sentencing
State v. Morris L. Harris, 2009AP2759-CR, District 1, 11/2/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Harris: Gary Grass; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Guilty Plea – Withdrawal – Presentence
The trial court properly applied the “fair and just reason” standard to Harris’s presentencing motion to withdraw guilty plea, ¶¶5-9.
The particular grounds asserted – no factual basis for plea;
Sentencing – Burden to Show Inaccurate Information
State v. Jason C. Walker, 2010AP83-CR, District 3, 11/2/10
court of appeals decision (recommended for publication); for Walker: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply
¶1 Jason Walker was sentenced after revocation of his probation. The sentencing court considered probation violations that Walker denied committing. Because of his denial, Walker argues the court could not consider the violations unless the State proved he committed them.
Compelled Self-Incrimination – Sentencing after Revocation
State v. Ronnie L. Peebles, 2010 WI App 156 (recommended for publication); for Peebles: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Use, at Peebles’ sentencing after revocation, of his incriminating statements made during counseling ordered as a condition of probation, violated the 5th amendment and requires resentencing. The court canvasses the leading cases – State v.
State v. Brandon G. Johnson, 2010AP233-CR, District 4, 10/14/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Johnson: Philip J. Brehm; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Restitution – Psychiatric Care – Sexual Assault
Johnson, 17, had sex with 14-year-old W.M.K., resulting in conviction for 3rd degree sexual assault. Restitution ($10k), awarded for W.M.K.’s 10-month residence at Thayer Learning Center, (described as “a boot camp, behavior modification experience”) satisfied “substantial factor”
Jury Instructions; Ineffective Assistance; Record on Appeal; Self-Defense
State v. Morris L. Harris, 2009AP2833-CR, District 1, 10/13/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Harris: Gary Grass; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Lesser-Included Instruction – Battery
Harris not entitled to instruction on simple battery as lesser included of substantial battery; the medical evidence established without contradiction that the victim suffered a fractured rib, therefore no reasonable jury could have acquitted him of the greater offense,
State v. Shantell T. Harbor, 2009AP1252-CR, Wis SCt rev granted 9/22/10
decision below: unpublished; for Harbor: Joseph E. Redding; court of appeals briefs: BiC; Resp.; Reply
Issues (from Table of Pending Cases):
Whether a defendant presented a new factor entitling sentence modification (See State v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 434 N.W.2d 609 (1989).
Whether a defendant demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v.
OWI – Collateral Attack on Priors
State v. David J. Bucknell, 2010AP833-CR, District 3, 9/30/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Bucknell: Rebecca M. Coffee; BiC; Resp.; Reply
A prior conviction, used to enhance a pending charge, may be collaterally attacked on the basis of denial of the 6th amendment right to counsel. Because “it is clear from Bucknell’s testimony at the hearings on his motion that he was aware of his right to be represented by an attorney at the prior proceeding and that he knowingly and intelligently relinquished that right,”