On Point blog, page 69 of 96
Sentence – Modification – New Factor: Parole Policy
State v. Lorenzo Wood, 2007 WI App 190, PFR filed 8/16/07
For Wood: Michael D. Kaiser
Issue/Holding: The governor’s 1994 letter exhorting bureaucratic opposition to (pre-TIS) parole for certain crimes was not a new factor, even though the sentencing court expressly took into consideration DOC data purporting to show the likely chance of parole:
¶11 We held in Delaney that the Thompson 1994 letter was not a “new factor” in part because: (1) there was no showing that the 1994 letter had any impact on Delaney’s discretionary parole eligibility;
Sentencing – Review – Modification – “New Factor,” Generally
State v. Lorenzo Wood, 2007 WI App 190, PFR filed 8/16/07
For Wood: Michael D. Kaiser
Issue/Holding:
¶5 A new factor, as defined in Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975), is
a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to the trial judge at the time of original sentencing,
Sentencing – Review – Excessiveness – Sexual Contact, Closeness in Age between Defendant and Minor Victim
State v. Donald W. Thexton, 2007 WI App 11, PFR filed 1/02/07
For Thexton: Kirk B. Obear
Issue/Holding: Sentence of 13 years (3 IC; 10 ES) for sexual contact was not harsh and excessive, notwithstanding closeness in age between defendant and underage victim:
¶12 As to excessiveness, Thexton notes that he was close in age to the victim. The sexual contact between the two began when he was seventeen and she fourteen and ended when he was eighteen and she fifteen.
Sentencing Review – Exercise of Discretion: Adequacy of Linkage of Objectives to Length
State v. Donald W. Thexton, 2007 WI App 11, PFR filed 1/02/07
For Thexton: Kirk B. Obear
Issue/Holding: The sentencing court satisfied Gallion’s required linkage:
¶11 … Here, the court explained that it did not consider Thexton’s conduct so serious that it required Thexton to be incarcerated for the length of time that might be appropriate for other sex offenders,
Fines – Exercise of Discretion – Articulation of Sentencing Objectives and Determination of Ability to Pay
State v. Ahern Ramel, 2007 WI App 271
For Ramel: Wm. Tyroler, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶14 A fine that an offender has the ability to pay may satisfy sentencing objectives the trial court has found to be material and relevant to the particular defendant. See id. Here, however, with no explanation from the sentencing court of how the fine imposed advanced those objectives,
Enhancer – Timing of Prior Conviction – Tolling During “Intensive Sanctions”
State v. Steven L. Pfeil, 2007 WI App 241
For Pfeil: John P. Tedesco, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Time spent in custody of the (now-lapsed) division of intensive sanctions tolls the limitation period for prior convictions, § 939.62(2):
¶2 …. We conclude that supervision under the intensive sanctions program constitutes “actual confinement” within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2). The intensive sanctions program operates as a correctional institution,
Allocution – Timing of Exercise of Right – Remedy for Violation
State v. Quantae T. Hines, 2007 WI App 39
For Hines: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue/Holding: A defendant has a right to allocute during a reconfinement proceeding, the remedy for violation of which is resentencing, ¶¶18-20.
The outcome is largely controlled by State v. John C. Brown, 2006 WI 131, which held that reconfinement is essentially a sentencing proceeding.
Earned Release Program – Petition for Eligibility under Pre-Effective Date (7/26/03) Sentence: DOC Approval Required but Refusal to Take Position = Approval
State v. Kathy J. Johnson, 2007 WI App 41
For Johnson: Jeremy Perri, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue: Whether DOC policy, for inmates under sentence commencing prior to July 26, 2003, to take no position on an ERP petition constitutes approval of the petition under Wis. Stat. § 302.05(3)(e).
Holding:
¶8 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.05(3)(e) governs inmate petitions for the determination of eligibility for the ERP for inmates sentenced prior to the effective date of § 302.05,
OWI – State’s Appeal: Collateral Attack on Prior OWI Conviction – Non-Final Order, Permission to Appeal Required
State v. Gary J. Knapp, 2007 WI App 273
For Knapp: Cory C. Chirafisi
Issue/Holding: The State may not appeal as a matter of right from a successful collateral attack on a prior OWI conviction, reducing the pending charge from OWI-3rd to -2nd; instead, the State’s remedy is to seek leave to appeal a non-final order:
¶2 A defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction to prevent its use as a penalty enhancer when the prior conviction was obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel.
Sentence Modification – Necessity of Postconviction Motion, Even Following Resentencing
State v. Roger S. Walker, 2006 WI 82, affirming as modified summary order
For Walker: James Rebholz
Issue/Holding: In order to obtain review, a defendant must file a postconviction motion to modify sentence, even if the event was a re-sentencing which came to the same result as originally imposed.
¶37 In the hope of clarifying appellate procedure, we conclude that when a defendant seeks modification of the sentence imposed at resentencing,