On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Anthony D., 2006 WI App 218
For Anthony D.: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate

Dicta: ¶7 n. 2:

We note that the language of the juvenile restitution statute differs from that of the criminal restitution statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.20. The criminal statute does not require the court to make a finding that the defendant can pay the restitution amount,

State v. Ronnie L. Thums, 2006 WI App 173
For Thums: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The remedy for a sentence imposed under an incorrect penalty scheme is resentencing:

¶14      Both parties agree that if the sentence the circuit court imposed was improper, Thums is entitled to be resentenced as to both components of the bifurcated sentence. We have held that the court did err when it applied TIS-I statutes during sentencing because those penalties were obsolete before Thums’ conduct became chargeable as stalking with a dangerous weapon.

State v. Donald Odom, 2006 WI App 145
For Odom: Eileen Miller Carter; J.C. Moore, SPD, Milwaukee Trial

Issue/Holding: The requirement of sentencing after probation revocation that the judge review the original sentencing transcript, State v. Reynolds, 2002 WI App 15, 249 Wis. 2d 798, 643 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 2001), does not apply to reconfinement after revocation of extended supervision, State v.

State v. Germaine M. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, affirming unpublished summary order
For Taylor: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶28 In terms of the length of his sentence, Taylor argues that there appeared to be no “starting point” for the court of some very low period of confinement, or even the period of confinement recommended by the PSI writer. We cannot agree.

State v. Roger S. Walker, 2006 WI 82, affirming as modified summary order
For Walker: James Rebholz

Issue/Holding: In order to obtain review, a defendant must file a postconviction motion to modify sentence, even if the event was a re-sentencing which came to the same result as originally imposed.

¶37      In the hope of clarifying appellate procedure, we conclude that when a defendant seeks modification of the sentence imposed at resentencing,

State v. Wayne Delaney, 2006 WI App 37
Pro se

Issue/Holding: Governor Thompson’s 1994 letter to the DOC exhorting pursuit of all available remedies to block release of (pre-TIS) violent offenders reaching their mandatory release date is not a new factor:

¶9        The existence of a new factor must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Franklin, 148 Wis.  2d at 8-9.

State v. Donald Odom, 2006 WI App 145
For Odom: Eileen Miller Carter; J.C. Moore, SPD, Milwaukee Trial

Issue/Holding: Trial court’s acknowledgement that Odom had been a productive citizen but that his numerous crimes “stood in stark contrast to that past” adequately accounted for Odom’s “positive attributes,” ¶24.

State v. Donald Odom, 2006 WI App 145
For Odom: Eileen Miller Carter; J.C. Moore, SPD, Milwaukee Trial

Issue/Holding: A trial court is not required to follow the sentencing guidelines, but only to explain a departure; the trial court’s explanation for departure (defendant’s lengthy record and reoffending upon release from confinement) was an adequate explanation, ¶26.

State v. Germaine M. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, affirming unpublished summary order
For Taylor: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: TIS sentence of 18 years (12 in, 6 out) for child sexual assault, consecutive to 5 year indeterminate sentence for similar offense, was not harsh and excessive, notwithstanding PSI recommendation of 12 years (6 in, 6 out), nonviolent nature of act, and closeness of victim to age of consent:

¶35 Although we recognize the accuracy of many of Taylor’s assertions,

State v. Gerald L. Lynch, Jr., 2006 WI App 231, PFR filed 11/6/06
For Lynch: David R. Karpe

Issue: Whether the sentencing court’s reliance on a television interview of the defendant, which led the court to criticize the defendant as “self-serving” rather than remorseful, violated the due process right to be sentenced on accurate information.

Holding:

¶24      We address first Lynch’s argument that the court had an obligation to give him advance notice that it was going to consider the television interview at sentencing.