On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Gerald L. Lynch, Jr., 2006 WI App 231, PFR filed 11/6/06
For Lynch: David R. Karpe

Issue: Whether the sentencing court’s reliance on a television interview of the defendant, which led the court to criticize the defendant as “self-serving” rather than remorseful, violated the due process right to be sentenced on accurate information.

Holding:

¶24      We address first Lynch’s argument that the court had an obligation to give him advance notice that it was going to consider the television interview at sentencing. 

State v. Jeris M. Moore, 2006 WI App 162
For Moore : Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶8        The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it denied Moore ’s motion without an in camera review of the confidential juvenile records. We conclude that the trial court should have conducted an in camerareview to determine whether the contents of those records rendered the resulting sentence one that was based on inaccurate information.

State v. Chad W. Ziegler, 2006 WI App 49, PFR filed 3/13/06
For Ziegler: Kenneth P. Casey, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶32      We conclude that the trial court’s sentencing remarks satisfy Hall as to the reasons for the consecutive sentences and Gallion as to the reasons for the length of the sentence. As noted, the trial court engaged in a thorough and exhaustive examination of the relevant sentencing objectives and factors.

State v. Ronnie L. Thums, 2006 WI App 173
For Thums: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether an offense which was partially committed during the TIS-I regime but not completed until advent of TIS-II comes under the former or latter sentencing regime.

Holding:

¶11      Thums had not committed the crime of stalking with a dangerous weapon during TIS-I. He therefore did not become subject to the TIS-I penalties during TIS-I.

State v. Jack W. Klubertanz, 2006 WI App 71, PFR filed 4/14/06
For Klubertanz: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶21      We conclude that the circuit court here properly exercised its sentencing discretion under the standards set forth in Gallion. The court identified the objectives it sought to achieve with the sentence it imposed: punishing Klubertanz, protecting the public,

State v. Chad W. Ziegler, 2006 WI App 49, PFR filed 3/13/06
For Ziegler: Kenneth P. Casey, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶23      The principal objectives of a sentence include, but are not limited to, the protection of the community, the punishment of the defendant, rehabilitation of the defendant, and deterrence to others. Id., ¶40. A sentencing court should indicate the general objectives of greatest importance and explain how,

State v. Germaine M. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, affirming unpublished summary order
For Taylor: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶17        The standards governing appellate review of an imposed sentence are well settled. [9] A circuit court exercises its discretion at sentencing, and appellate review is limited to determining if the court’s discretion was erroneously exercised.

…

¶27      All told,

State v. Steven A. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26
For Harvey: Christopher William Rose

Issue/Holding:

¶47      Harvey correctly states Gallion’s teaching that probation should be considered as the first sentencing alternative. Gallion, 270 Wis.  2d 535, ¶25. Here, the trial court expressly addressed probation. … In sum, the court concluded that probation would unduly depreciate the offense. …

¶48      Probation should be the disposition unless confinement is necessary to protect the public,

State v. Donald Odom, 2006 WI App 145
For Odom: Eileen Miller Carter; J.C. Moore, SPD, Milwaukee Trial

Issue/Holding: Trial court’s discussion of the three primary sentencing factors was adequate, though the court did not explicitly identify those factors, ¶25.

State v. Jeremy D. Russ, 2006 WI App 9
For Russ: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶14      This court observes a strong policy of deferring to the sentencing discretion of a trial court, presuming the sentence to be reasonable unless the defendant can demonstrate from the record that the court acted unreasonably. State v. Mosley, 201 Wis. 2d 36,