On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Jose A. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45, affirming summary order of court of appeals
For Trujillo: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶13 We define a new factor as “an event or development which frustrates the purpose of the original sentence,” Champion, 258 Wis. 2d 781, ¶4, and recognize it to be more than a change in circumstances since the time of sentencing. 

State v. Alan J. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, on certification
For Ernst: Jeffrey W. Jensen

Issue1: Whether violation of the standards mandated by State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194 ¶24, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997) for valid waiver of counsel supports a collateral attack on a prior conviction.
Holding1:

¶25      … For there to be a valid collateral attack,

State v. Ryan E. Baker, 2005 WI App 45, PFR filed 3/17/05
For Baker: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Sentence credit may not be used to satisfy court costs, where costs were imposed under provisions which do not grant authority to waive or otherwise avoid their imposition:

¶11                        We turn now to whether credit for pre-sentence incarceration time may be applied to satisfy court costs.  

State v. Mark R. Johnson, 2005 WI App 201
For Johnson: Jefren Olsen , SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶13      Second, before a trial court may order restitution “there must be a showing that the defendant’s criminal activity was a substantial factor in causing” pecuniary injury to the victim in a “but for” sense. Longmire, 272 Wis. 2d 759, ¶13; State v.

State v. Mark R. Johnson, 2005 WI App 201
For Johnson: Jefren Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶12      First, restitution is limited to “special damages … which could be recovered in a civil action against the defendant for his or her conduct in the commission of a crime considered at sentencing.” Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a). The term “special damages” as used in the criminal restitution context means any readily ascertainable pecuniary expenditure paid out because of the crime. 

State v. Mark R. Johnson, 2005 WI App 201
For Johnson: Jefren Olsen , SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding1: Lost profits are “special damages,” and therefore subject to a restitution order, because the underlying causal criminal conduct could give rise to a civil action based on the torts of conversion and interference with prospective contractual relationships, ¶¶16-17.

Issue/Holding2: Because at least a minimal amount of speculation inheres to such a claim,

State v. Brandon E. Jones, 2005 WI App 259
For Jones: Amelia L. Bizarro

Issue: Whether the sentencing court provided sufficient reasons for Jones’s reconfinement following revocation of extended supervision.

Holding:

¶9        ….  The key is for the circuit court to provide sufficient information about its reasoning so as to allow for meaningful review. The “need for meaningful appellate review of a trial court’s decision to take away a person’s liberty must be our polestar.” Swiams,

State v. James L. Montroy, 2005  WI App 230
For Montroy: Jay E. Heit; Stephanie L. Finn

Issue/Holding:

¶14    Montroy also argues a new PSI is necessary because the inaccurate information will continue to prejudice him in the future. He cites Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.27 (Nov. 2002) for examples of the various uses for a PSI beyond sentencing. However, Wis. Stat. § 973.08(2) requires that the transcript of Montroy’s sentencing hearing be part of his record. 

State v. Jose A. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45, affirming summary order of court of appeals
For Trujillo: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the TIS-II reduction of penalty, such that this TIS-I defendant was sentenced to confinement exceeding what would have been the TIS-II maximum, is a “new factor” supporting modification of sentence.
Holding:

¶21 We are not persuaded by Trujillo’s attempt to convince us to distinguish Hegwood and overrule Torres.

State v. John Doe, 2005 WI App 68
For John Doe: Amelia L. Bizzaro (the court file has been ordered sealed, and the caption amended “to shield the defendant’s identity”)

Issue/Holding: “(A) defendant’s substantial and important assistance to law enforcement after sentencing may constitute a new factor that the trial court can take into consideration when deciding whether modification of a sentence is warranted,” ¶1.

¶8.