On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Charles J. Burroughs, 2002 WI App 18
For Burroughs: William F. Mross

Issue/Holding: Burroughs’ prior conviction in Alabama for assault with intent to murder is sufficiently comparable to attempted first degree intentional homicide so as to support exposure to persistent offender sentencing, § 939.62(2m)(c). ¶¶23-27.

State v. Michael A. Sveum,  2002 WI App 105, PFR filed 5/10/02
For Sveum: Ian A.J. Pitz

Issue/Holding: A repeater enhancement applies only to a crime, which is an offense prohibited by state law and punishable by fine and/or imprisonment. Violation of harassment injunction fits this definition and therefore supports repeater enhancement. State v. Carpenter, 179 Wis. 2d 838, 508 N.W.2d 69 (Ct.

State v. Charles J. Burroughs, 2002 WI App 18
For Burroughs: William F. Mross

Issue: Whether the record sufficiently supports Burroughs’ guilty plea on a prior offense supporting his persistent offender status.

Holding: Because Burroughs doesn’t contest the fact that he was represented by counsel when he entered the plea to the prior offense, his right to challenge the plea is barred under State v.

State v. Paul Delao Quiroz, 2002 WI App 52
For Quiroz: Chad G. Kerkman

Issue: Whether the maximum penalty for first-degree reckless endangerment of safety, enhanced by while armed and gang-related provisions, was 13 or 14 years.

Holding:

¶13 … [State v. Pernell, 165 Wis. 2d 651, 656, 478 N.W.2d 297 (Ct. App. 1991)] establishes that when two penalty enhancers are applicable to the same crime,

State v. Gary L. Gordon, 2002 WI App 53, reversed on other grounds, 2003 WI 69
For Gordon: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The trial court erroneously exercised discretion in imposing costs for the travel expense of an officer, in that this expense was necessitated by a change in trial date attributable primarily to the prosecution, not the defendant. ¶¶49-51.

State v. Lawrence P. Peters, 2001 WI 74, 244 Wis. 2d 470, 628 N.W.2d 797, reversing, 2000 WI App 154, 237 Wis. 2d 741, 615 N.W.2d 655
For Peters: Jane K. Smith

Issue: Whether Peters may, at his OAR-5th sentencing, collaterally attack his OAR-2d conviction, on the ground of denial of counsel.

Holding:

¶4 We view this case as falling within the right-to-counsel exception to the general rule against collateral attacks on prior convictions.

State v. Jeremy J. Hanson, 2001 WI 70, 244 Wis. 2d 405, 628 N.W.2d 759, reversing unpublished decision of court of appeals
For Hanson: James B. Connell

Issue: Whether a guilty or no contest plea waives the right to challenge the defendant’s status as an habitual traffic offender, and the right to challenge the HTO sentencing penalty as unauthorized.

Holding:

¶21. Section 973.13 requires Wisconsin courts to declare a sentence void ‘[i]n any case where the court imposes a maximum penalty in excess of that authorized by law.’

State v. Paul L. Wolfe, 2001 WI App 66, 242 Wis. 2d 426, 625 N.W.2d 655
For Wolfe: Gary Seeling

Issue: “The basic question before us is whether a court, in a multiple count conviction where one sentence is imposed and another stayed, must apply sentence credit to the conviction of the first imposed sentence,” ¶1.

Holding:

¶1. … We hold that it must under the rule of State v.

State v. James A. Torpen, 2001 WI App 273, PFR filed 11/13/01
For Torpen: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether a court has authority to order, as restitutive conditions of probation, payment of obligations from prior, unrelated criminal cases.

Holding:

¶14. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.20, a circuit court may order the payment of restitution to victims of crimes for which the defendant is being sentenced,

State v. Chad J. Knoll, 2000 WI App 135, 237 Wis.2d 384, 614 N.W.2d 20
For Knoll: Ralph Kalal

Issue: Whether passenger Foust, injured in the crash of a car whose driver (Knoll) was drunk, was party to the crime of drunk driving and therefore not a “victim” for purposes of restitution.

Holding:

¶11           Because Knoll has not established either that Foust undertook conduct to aid Knoll in operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated or that Foust intended his conduct to help Knoll drive while impaired,