On Point blog, page 94 of 95
Costs – allocated per count, § 814.60(1)
State v. Lisa A. Carter, 229 Wis. 2d 200, 598 N.W.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Carter: Paul G. LaZotte
Issue/Holding: The $20 fee for the clerk of court under § 814.60(1) is allocated on a per-count, rather than per-case, basis.
Allocution – Generally
State v. James C. Lindsey, 203 Wis. 2d 423, 554 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1996)
For Lindsey: Park M. Drescher
Issue/Holding:
It is undisputed that the trial court at the sentencing hearing erred when it did not afford Lindsey the right of allocution provided by § 972.14(2), Stats. …First, we conclude that because § 972.14(2), Stats., clearly establishes a statutory right of allocution and because the trial court did not follow the mandate of § 972.14(2),
Restitution – Limitations — court’s competency to order refund
State v. James D. Minniecheske, 223 Wis.2d 493, 590 N.W.2d 17 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Minniechske: Jane K. Smith
Issue: Whether the sentencing court possessed authority to order refund of money ($1500+) improperly seized from Minniecheske’s prison account to satisfy restitution.
Holding:
We conclude that the trial court correctly amended the judgment of conviction to remove the restitution obligation.[1] We further agree that,
Restitution — “Victim” — Police: As Crime Prevention Organization
State v. Crystal L. Bizzle, 222 Wis. 2d 100, 585 N.W. 899 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Bizzle: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
To define “crime prevention organization” to include law enforcement agencies would lead to absurd results. By ordering a defendant to make a contribution to a “crime prevention organization,” a court could order a defendant to repay internal operating expenses of a police department and routine operating expenses of the State Crime Laboratory or return drug “buy money”
Sentence Modification: Judicial Estoppel Bar — Agreement to Recommended Sentence
Scott A. Magnuson, 220 Wis. 2d 468, 583 N.W.2d 843 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Magnuson: T. Gregory Amann
Issue/Holding:
We conclude that Magnuson is judicially estopped from asserting that the two twelve-year concurrent sentences are excessive. Although Magnuson contends he did not agree to the recommended sentence, the record belies his claim. Magnuson’s probation officer set forth the recommendation in the presentence investigation report (PSI).
Sentencing – Review — Factors — Character — Rehabilitative Needs
State v. Crystal L. Bizzle, 222 Wis. 2d 100, 585 N.W. 899 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Bizzle: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
Bizzle argues that the sentencing court erred in concluding that she required extensive rehabilitation. … First, her successful completion of an educational program, after sentencing, is not evidence that the court acted unreasonably or was not justified in concluding that she required extensive rehabilitation.
Sentencing – Factors: Seriousness of Offense
State v. Pablo Cruz Santana, 220 Wis. 2d 674, 584 N.W.2d 151 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Santana: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
In passing sentence, the trial court addressed each of the primary factors, but chiefly relied on the seriousness of the offense and its continuing impact on the victim. …
Santana claims, however, that the judge’s comments also evinced an impermissible consideration of how the sentence imposed would be perceived by the public,
Enhancer — § 161.48(2) (1993-94), Drug Offender — Second or Subsequent Offense
State v. Frank Miles, 221 Wis. 2d 56, 584 N.W.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Miles: Craig W. Albee
Issue/Holding: Prior drug conviction is not element of crime of second or subsequent drug offense, § 161.48(2) (1993-94), which elevates what would otherwise be misdemeanor to felony possession:
Miles fails to recognize the distinction between the two types of penalty enhancers. The first type of penalty enhancer concerns facts or circumstances related to the underlying crime which alter the substantive nature of the charged offense.
Enhancers — § 961.49, Youth Center
Debra L. Van Riper, 222 Wis. 2d 197, 586 N.W.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Van Riper: Megan L. DeVore
Issue/Holding:
Because day care centers provide recreational and social services activities for children, they are a subset of “youth centers” and come within the definition of places listed in § 961.49(2), Stats. The protection of children, who congregate at day care centers, and are very vulnerable to the dangers associated with drug trafficking,
Enhancer — Persistent Repeater, § 939.62(2m)(b) — Equal Protection Challenge
State v. Damone J. Block, 222 Wis. 2d 586, 587 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Block: James M. Weber
Issue/Holding: The persistent repeater scheme survives equal protection challenge.
Block concedes that the persistent repeater statute deserves only the rational basis test. He argues that there are no reasonable or practical grounds for the manner in which the legislature has chosen serious crimes under § 939.62(2m),