On Point: Cruel/unusual punishment

Questions presented:

1) Does the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), apply retroactively to this case?

2) Is a federal question raised by a claim that a state collateral review court erroneously failed to find that a new constitutional rule fits within an exception to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which held that new constitutional rules are generally not applied retroactively to cases on collateral review?

Freddie Lee Hall v. Florida, USSC No. 12-10882, May 27, 2014, reversing Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Because “intellectual disability is a condition, not a number,” and an IQ score is an approximation, not a final and infallible assessment of intellectual functioning, the Supreme Court invalidates Florida’s bright-line rule that a defendant is not intellectually disabled—and thus may be executed—if he has never scored below 70 on an IQ test.

The Sentencing Law and Policy blog (an affiliate of the law professor blogs network) tees up the issue nicely.  Their post is pasted in below.

When and how will SCOTUS take up Miller retroactivity issues?

The question in the title of this post is promoted by this local piece reporting on reactions to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision last week (reported here) that its state teens given mandatory LWOP before the US Supreme Court’s Miller ruling should not get any retroactive benefit from that decision.

Question presented:

Whether the Florida scheme for identifying mentally retarded defendants in capital cases violates Atkins v. Virginia.

Lower court opinion: Hall v. State, 109 So.3d 704 (Fla. 2012)

Docket

Scotusblog page

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), held that it is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to execute a person who is found to be mentally retarded.

Evan Miller v. Alabama, USSC No. 10-9646 / Kuntrell Jackson v. Hobbs, No. 10-9647, 6/25/12,  reversing 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)

The two 14-year-old offenders in these cases were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In neither case did the sentencing authority have any discretion to impose a different punishment. State law mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge or jury would have thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics,

Miller: SCOTUSblog page; consolidated with Jackson: SCOTUSblog page

Question Presented (from SCOTUSblog):

Whether imposing a sentence of life without possibility of parole on an offender who was fourteen at the time he committed capital murder constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Sound at least vaguely familiar? It should: our supreme court resolved that very question last Term,

DOC v. Warren Lilly, Jr., 2011 WI App 123 (recommended for publication); case activity

¶2        The primary issues we address on this appeal and their resolution are as follows:

I.                   In light of Saenz, what is the correct legal standard for the showing DOC must make to obtain a court order continuing to authorize the forced feeding of an inmate?[1]

We conclude that in this situation DOC must show that: (1) if forced feeding is withdrawn,

seventh circuit decision

Cruel and Unusual Punishment – Prison Inmates, Denial of Treatment for Gender Identity Disorder

Section 302.386(5m) (2010), which categorically bars hormonal therapy or sexual reassignment surgery to prison inmates, violates the 8th amendment.

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when they display ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’ ” Greeno v. Daley,

State v. Omer Ninham, 2011 WI 33, affirming, 2009 WI App 64; for Ninham: Frank M. Tuerkheimer, Bryan Stevenson; amici: Byron C. Lichstein, Robert R. Henak, G. Michael Halfenger, et al.; case activity

Sentencing – Life without Parole for Juveniles – Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Sentence of life without parole imposed on juvenile (Ninham was 14 when he committed the crime) upheld,

Graham v. Florida, USSC No. 08-7412, 5/17/10

In sum, penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. This determination; the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders; and the severity of life without parole sentences all lead to the conclusion that the sentencing practice under consideration is cruel and unusual. This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.