On Point: 3. Harsh and excessive

Evan Miller v. Alabama, USSC No. 10-9646 / Kuntrell Jackson v. Hobbs, No. 10-9647, 6/25/12,  reversing 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)

The two 14-year-old offenders in these cases were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In neither case did the sentencing authority have any discretion to impose a different punishment. State law mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge or jury would have thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics,

State v. Dwain M. Staten, 2011AP916-CR, District 1, 5/8/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Staten: Michael J. Steinle; case activity

Postconviction DNA Testing, § 974.07 

Postconviction testing at state expense requires, among other things, that the defendant show a reasonable probability he wouldn’t have been prosecuted or convicted with exculpatory test results. Staten, whose defense to sexual assault was consent rather than misidentification,

State v. Thaying Lor, 2011AP2019-CR, District 1, 5/1/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Lor: Benjamin F. Gallagher; case activity

Effective Assistance of Counsel 

Counsel did not provide ineffective representation in the following respects:

• Failure to timely file motion seeking admission of complainant’s prior untruthful allegation of sexual assault. However, Lor did not provide, including in his postconviction motion,

Miller: SCOTUSblog page; consolidated with Jackson: SCOTUSblog page

Question Presented (from SCOTUSblog):

Whether imposing a sentence of life without possibility of parole on an offender who was fourteen at the time he committed capital murder constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Sound at least vaguely familiar? It should: our supreme court resolved that very question last Term,

State v. Aaron Deal, 2010AP1804-CR, District 1, 9/20/11 

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Deal: James A. Rebholz; case activity

Counsel’s refusal to argue to the jury that it should return a guilty verdict on felony murder, submitted as a lesser offense option of first-degree intentional homicide, wasn’t deficient in light of the defendant’s insistence on an all-or-nothing strategy.

¶8        At the Machner hearing,

State v. Burt Terrell Johnson, Jr., 2010AP2654-CR, District 1, 9/13/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Johnson: Sara Heinemann Roemaat; case activity

Counsel did not perform deficiently.

1. Decision not to make opening statement was reasonable strategy, given that the defense didn’t plan to call any witnesses but instead intended “to put the State to its proof,” ¶21.
2. Failure to object to State’s closing argument characterizing what the victim “saw”

State v. Guadalupe Jose Rivas, 2010AP2777-CR, District 1, 9/13/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Rivas: George Tauscheck; case activity

¶5        Rivas argues that four instances of inaccurate information mentioned by the trial court at his sentencing require resentencing:  (1) the trial court believed that Rivas had five prior felonies when he had only four; (2) the trial court mischaracterized Rivas as a drug dealer;

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Linssen: Thomas C. Simon; case activity

Sentence Review – Harsh & Excessive 

Sentence to maximum term of confinement for felony theft and forgery wasn’t harsh and excessive, notwithstanding lack of prior criminal record.

¶23      Linssen has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the sentencing court relied on improper factors, see Harris,

DOC v. Warren Lilly, Jr., 2011 WI App 123 (recommended for publication); case activity

¶2        The primary issues we address on this appeal and their resolution are as follows:

I.                   In light of Saenz, what is the correct legal standard for the showing DOC must make to obtain a court order continuing to authorize the forced feeding of an inmate?[1]

We conclude that in this situation DOC must show that: (1) if forced feeding is withdrawn,

seventh circuit decision

Cruel and Unusual Punishment – Prison Inmates, Denial of Treatment for Gender Identity Disorder

Section 302.386(5m) (2010), which categorically bars hormonal therapy or sexual reassignment surgery to prison inmates, violates the 8th amendment.

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when they display ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’ ” Greeno v. Daley,