On Point: 3. Harsh and excessive

State v. David A. Reeves, 2010AP1590-CR, District 4, 6/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Reeves: Anthony J. Jurek; case activity

Maximum sentence for obstructing (9 months) upheld against argument it was a) harsh and excessive; b) based on improper factors. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, reviewed and applied.

State v. Omer Ninham, 2011 WI 33, affirming, 2009 WI App 64; for Ninham: Frank M. Tuerkheimer, Bryan Stevenson; amici: Byron C. Lichstein, Robert R. Henak, G. Michael Halfenger, et al.; case activity

Sentencing – Life without Parole for Juveniles – Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Sentence of life without parole imposed on juvenile (Ninham was 14 when he committed the crime) upheld,

State v. Anthony M. Smith, 2009AP2867-CR, District 1/4, 3/3/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Smith: Rodney Cubbie, Syovata K. Edari; case activity

Trial court’s limitations on cross-examination with respect to State witness’s “prior mental condition” or use of medications (prescribed for his Bipolar Disorder and Attention Deficit Disorder) upheld as proper exercise of discretion. The witness was taking his medication at the time of the alleged offense,

State v. Seneca Joseph Boykin, 2009AP2499-CR, District 2, 9/22/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Boykin: Mark A. Schoenfeldt; BiC; Resp.

A probation agent may not evade the warrant requirement by acting as a “stalking horse” for the police in conducting a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence, ¶10. In this instance, probation officer Navis, acting on reliable information that Boykin was using and selling cocaine,

Graham v. Florida, USSC No. 08-7412, 5/17/10

In sum, penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. This determination; the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders; and the severity of life without parole sentences all lead to the conclusion that the sentencing practice under consideration is cruel and unusual. This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.

State v. Anthony L. Prineas, 2009 WI App 28
For Prineas: Raymond M. Dall’Osto, Kathryn A. Keppel

Issue/Holding: Prineas was convicted on 2 counts of 2nd-degree sexual assault, and acquitted on another 4; the PSI recommended 6-8 years, but he was sentenced to 10 IC, 10 ES and a concurrent 30-year term of probation; though a first-time offender, the disposition is upheld against a claim of harsh and excessive sentence,

State v. Donald W. Thexton, 2007 WI App 11, PFR filed 1/02/07
For Thexton: Kirk B. Obear

Issue/Holding: Sentence of 13 years (3 IC; 10 ES) for sexual contact was not harsh and excessive, notwithstanding closeness in age between defendant and underage victim:

¶12      As to excessiveness, Thexton notes that he was close in age to the victim. The sexual contact between the two began when he was seventeen and she fourteen and ended when he was eighteen and she fifteen.

State v. Germaine M. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, affirming unpublished summary order
For Taylor: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: TIS sentence of 18 years (12 in, 6 out) for child sexual assault, consecutive to 5 year indeterminate sentence for similar offense, was not harsh and excessive, notwithstanding PSI recommendation of 12 years (6 in, 6 out), nonviolent nature of act, and closeness of victim to age of consent:

¶35 Although we recognize the accuracy of many of Taylor’s assertions,

State v. Wallace I. Stenzel, 2004 WI App 181
For Stenzel: Martin E. Kohler

Issue/Holding:

¶21. Finally, Stenzel asserts that the court erroneously exercised its discretion because the sentence is unduly harsh and unconscionable. When a defendant argues that his or her sentence is unduly harsh or excessive, we will hold that the sentencing court erroneously exercised its discretion “only where the sentence is so excessive and unusual and so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.” 

State v. Richard G.B., 2003 WI App 13, PFR filed 1/13/03
For Richard G.B.: Bridget E. Boyle

Issue/Holding: Sentence of 18 years for sexual assault of a child (mouth-vagina intercourse with 15 year-old niece) wasn’t harsh and excessive, measured against a maximum possible sentence of 20 years. Trial court also “articulated its reasoning for the sentence and considered the appropriate factors” (namely, primary sentencing factors, weighed against Richard’s character).