On Point blog, page 5 of 6
Sentencing court didn’t err in its interpretation or application of COMPAS report
State v. Jordan John Samsa, 2015 WI App 6; case activity
The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in using the criminogenic needs section of the COMPAS assessment report, which identifies areas in which the offender needs correctional or community intervention, as an indicator of Samsa’s danger to the community.
Sentencing court didn’t improperly rely on defendant’s immigration status
State v. Leopoldo R. Salas Gayton, 2013AP646-CR, District 1, 10/7/14 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 11/4/15, affirmed, 2016 WI 58; case activity
The sentencing court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion by relying in part on Gayton’s immigration status or by failing to explain its reasons for imposing the maximum term of initial confinement and the DNA surcharge.
Failure to present evidence of alternative sources for child’s sexual knowledge wasn’t ineffective
State v. Bryanntton A. Brown, 2013AP1332-CR, District 1, 6/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present certain evidence that the complainant in Brown’s child sexual assault prosecution may have obtained her sexual knowledge from watching TV and movies and talking to her older sister. Nor was trial counsel ineffective for not taking steps to mitigate the impact of a letter Brown purportedly wrote to Carson, a fellow jail inmate, in which Brown admitted the charges. Finally, the circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.
State v. Danny Alexander, 2013AP843-CR, petition for review granted 6/12/14
On review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity
Issue (composed by On Point)
Did the inclusion in the PSI of statements Alexander made to his probation agent, and the trial court’s consideration of the statements at sentencing, violate Alexander’s right against self-incrimination?
Resentencing required because PSI included defendant’s compelled statements to probation agent
State v. Danny Robert Alexander, 2013AP843-CR, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 6/12/14, reversed, 2015 WI 6; case activity
Alexander was on probation when he was charged with forgery. He pled to the forgery and a PSI was prepared. (¶2). Attached to the PSI were statements the defendant made to his probation agent about two other forgeries.
Judge’s invocations of religious deity were “ill-advised,” but do not show he imposed sentence based on religious considerations
State v. Robert J. Betters, 2013 WI App 85; case activity
When sentencing of Betters for child sexual assault, the judge stated that “every child is a gift from God,” and indicated Betters’s conduct toward the victims was “an abomination in the sight of God and in the sight of man, and … totally unacceptable.” ( ¶¶4, 15). The court of appeals rejects Betters’s claim that these references show the judge sentenced Betters based on religious considerations because the “offhand religious references”
Victim impact statement — consideration at sentencing
State v. Jack Minniecheske, 2012AP1133, District 3, 1/23/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, not eligible for publication); case activity
Because Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v)(m) gives victims the right to provide statements at sentencing, the circuit court properly considered a victim impact statement despite defendant’s objection to it as “frivolous” and his claim the victim stole his property. “Moreover, given Minniecheske’s sentence, a fine and costs, there is no indication in the record that the court sentenced Minniecheske more harshly because of the allegations in the victim impact statement.” (¶8).
Sentencing Discretion – Reliance on Dismissed Charge; Read-In Procedure: Dismissed Charges, Distinguished
State v. Michael L. Frey, 2012 WI 99, affirming unpublished decision; case activity
Sentencing Discretion – Reliance on Dismissed Charge
The sentencing court may consider charges “dismissed” or “dismissed outright” (as opposed to read-ins)
¶47 To discharge its obligation to discern a defendant’s character, “[a] sentencing court may consider uncharged and unproven offenses,” State v. Leitner,
Sentencing – Factors – Medical Care
State v. Lisa L. Payne, 2010AP1995-CR, District 3, 12/20/11
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Payne: Eric R. Pangburn; case activity
The court, in imposing a sentence to prison confinement term of 13 months, expressly took into effect the possibility that Payne’s medical needs would not “be addressed adequately in a county jail.” Upon postconviction challenge to the sentence, “however, the court clarified that the length of Payne’s sentence was not dependent upon the care that she would receive in either jail or prison,”
State v. Michael L. Frey, 2010AP2801-CR, rev. granted 12/14/11
on review of unpublished decision; for Frey: Devon M. Lee, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity
Sentencing Discretion – Reliance on Dismissed Charge
Issue (composed by On Point):
Whether sentencing discretion was erroneously exercised by undue reliance on, including unfounded inferences drawn from, a charge dismissed “outright.”
Frey was charged with sexually assaulting two girls. Both testified at the preliminary hearing. Frey ended up pleading no contest to assaulting one,